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This project is dedicated to my Uncle George, who passed away this month following a brave
battle with cancer (and many skirmishes with the bureaucracy of the United States health care
system).
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Abstract:
Across nearly all categories, the United States kidney care system ranks below its global
counterparts. With a high prevalence of kidney disease, poor treatment outcomes, and high
expenditures, there is no doubt that the U.S. kidney system needs revamping. In 2019, the Trump
administration released the Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative, which, among other
things, both restructures the Medicare payment systems for kidney care to incentivize new
treatment practices and outcomes and alters the kidney transplant system in an effort to increase
transplant rates. Alongside the goal of improving patient outcomes, the proposal seeks to reduce
the expenditures of this Medicare entitlement program. While the proposal answers many of the
major requests of the kidney community for improvements, the proposal must also be
interrogated with the awareness of the Trump administration’s intentions of eliminating such
entitlement programs and the general hostility of President Trump towards Medicare. Alongside
this potential issue are several pitfalls in the proposal, including lack of transparency for patients,
penalization of providers, absence of a safety net for poor and high-risk patients, and, some
allege, a potentially risky living donor reimbursement program. This project aims to identify the
promising aspects of the proposal alongside the potential risks of this new care model while
drawing on the experiences of other industrialized countries in the realm of kidney care.
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Glossary:
AAKH

Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative

ACA

Affordable Care Act

APD

Automated Peritoneal Dialysis

AV Fistula

Artificially connected artery in a vein, used for easier access to
the veins for dialysis

CAPD

Continuous Ambulatory Peritoneal Dialysis

CKD

Chronic kidney disease, abnormality in kidney function

CMMI

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, otherwise known
as the “Innovation Center”

CMS

Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services

CVD

Cardiovascular disease

Deceased donor

One whose organs are donated after death

Dialysis

Removal of wastes from the body, replicating kidney function.
Includes peritoneal dialysis, or PD (removal of waste by adding
fluid to the abdominal cavity) and hemodialysis, or HD
(removal of waste from blood using a machine)

eGFR

Glomerular Filtration Rate, measures how well a patient’s
kidneys are filtering blood by measuring how much of the waste
product creatinine as compared to a patients age, race, sex and
weight

ETC Model

Proposed End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices Model

ESRD

End-stage renal disease, when a kidney ceases to function and
the patient requires ongoing dialysis treatment

Forum of ESRD Networks

Non-profit organization of ESRD Networks to communicate the
national quality agenda on kidney disease

HDPA

Home Dialysis Payment Adjustment, portion of ETC Model

HHS

Department of Health and Human Services

HTN

Hypertension
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LIS

Low-Income Subsidy for Medicare recipients

Living donor

One who consents to donate for transplantation to another
person

MPS

Modality Performance Score, of the AAKH

Nephrologist

Doctor who specializes in kidney care

NESRDP

National End Stage Renal Disease Program, established the
Medicare entitlement program for kidney disease in 1965

NKF

National Kidney Foundation

NOTA

National Organ Transplant Act of 1984

OPO

Organ Procurement Organization

Palliative care

End of life care that primarily aims to improve the quality of
life and manage pain

PPA

Performance Payment Adjustment

PPS

ESRD Prospective Payment System that bundles Medicare
payment for dialysis into a single per treatment payment
amount

QoL

Quality of Life

UNOS

United Network for Organ Sharing

Urine albumin

Protein present in the urine when the kidneys are not filtering
properly filtering, used as an indication of the filtering
effectiveness of the kidney.

USRDS

United States Renal Data System
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the United States, one in three adults are at risk for Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD).1
The term “Chronic Kidney Disease” encompasses a range of issues with the kidneys, which,
when left untreated, can lead to kidney failure, also known as End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD).
The two most common causes of kidney disease in this country are diabetes and high blood
pressure, which make up 45% and 29% of newly diagnosed cases, respectively.2,3 Thirty-two
percent of adults in the U.S. have hypertension; 4 9.5% of adults have diabetes.5 As a direct result
of these high prevalences, at least 37 million people in the U.S. have CKD, and more than
750,000 have ESRD.6 Otherwise known as the “Silent Killer,” kidney disease is difficult to
detect in its early stages, with some researchers estimating that only half of all patients with
CKD are aware of their condition.7
While it is already striking that one in three adults are at risk in the general population,
some populations are at even higher risks than others. Odds are already stacked against African
Americans, Hispanics, and indigenous peoples to develop kidney disease, as they have both
higher rates of diabetes and kidney disease and lower access to health care than their white

1

“High Blood Pressure Fact Sheet|Data & Statistics|DHDSP|CDC,” January 9, 2019,
https://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fs_bloodpressure.htm.
2
National Institute of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, “2018 USRDS
Annual Data Report: Epidemiology of Kidney Disease in the United States” (United States Renal Data System:
NIH, n.d.), https://www.usrds.org/reference.aspx. (Computed from:2018 ADR Reference Tables by NKF.org)
3
Alongside these two chronic conditions, other factors that can contribute to loss of kidney function are
glomerulonephritis (an illness affecting kidney function), genetic diseases including polycystic kidney disease, birth
defects, immune diseases, obstructions of kidney functions (i.e. kidney stones), and urinary tract infections.
4
“High Blood Pressure Fact Sheet|Data & Statistics|DHDSP|CDC.”
5
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “National Chronic Kidney Disease Fact Sheet” (US Department of
Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/kidneydisease/pdf/2019_National-Chronic-Kidney-Disease-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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counterparts.8,9 As such, these groups represent much higher proportions of the kidney disease
population than they do the general U.S. population. (African Americans, for instance, make up
35% of all kidney patients but only 13% of the general U.S. population.)10 Similarly, within the
kidney patient population, 71% of individuals aged 18 to 64 on dialysis are unemployed, an
exponentially higher proportion than in the general U.S. population.11
Once they reach the stage of renal failure, patients must begin dialysis in order to survive.
Dialysis works to filter a patient’s blood in absence of normal kidney functions, with the
majority of U.S. kidney patients receiving dialysis in dialysis centers rather than at home.12 The
two main categories of dialysis, peritoneal and hemodialysis, differ primarily in the way they
filter the blood and the fact that peritoneal dialysis is usually utilized as an in-home dialysis
treatment. Strikingly, the United States has one of the highest mortality rates for kidney dialysis
patients in the world, at 21.7% in contrast to other industrialized regions such as Japan (6.6%)
and Europe (average of 15.6%).13
The gold standard for kidney disease treatment, associated with both the lowest long-term
costs and best outcomes and quality of life, is the kidney transplant. Unfortunately, due to a
combination of low rates of kidney donation from deceased and living donors and the growing

8

Kendal Orgera, Anthony Damico Published: Mar 05, and 2020, “Changes in Health Coverage by Race and
Ethnicity since the ACA, 2010-2018,” The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (blog), March 5, 2020,
https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/issue-brief/changes-in-health-coverage-by-race-and-ethnicity-since-the-aca2010-2018/.
9
Elias K. Spanakis and Sherita Hill Golden, “Race/Ethnic Difference in Diabetes and Diabetic Complications,”
Current Diabetes Reports 13, no. 6 (December 2013), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11892-013-0421-9.
10
“Race, Ethnicity, & Kidney Disease | NIDDK,” National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases,
accessed April 28, 2020, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/kidney-disease/race-ethnicity.
11
Rebecca J. Muehrer et al., “Factors Affecting Employment at Initiation of Dialysis,” Clinical Journal of the
American Society of Nephrology 6, no. 3 (March 1, 2011): 489–96, https://doi.org/10.2215/CJN.02550310.
12
Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, “Regulations.Gov - Proposed Rule Document: Medicare Program:
Speciality Care Models to Improve Quality of Care and REduce Expenditures,” regulations.gov, September 16,
2019, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2019-0101-0001.
13
Robert N. Foley and Raymond M. Hakim, “Why Is the Mortality of Dialysis Patients in the United States Much
Higher than the Rest of the World?,” Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 20, no. 7 (July 1, 2009): 1432–
35, https://doi.org/10.1681/ASN.2009030282.
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ESRD population, the current waitlist for a kidney in the United States is five years. As a result,
more than 4,500 people die while on the kidney transplant waitlist annually. 14
Ninety percent of patients with ESRD are covered under the ESRD Medicare entitlement
program created for kidney disease patients in the 1970’s.15 Today, 7% of total Medicare
spending is used for ESRD, despite the fact that ESRD patients make up only 1% of the
Medicare population.16 When combined with spending on CKD, kidney disease patients
represent 23% of the total fee for service Medicare spending. As such, reducing expenditures to
this program have consistently been a goal for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS).
As a country with a comparatively high prevalence of, poor treatment outcomes for, and
high expenditures on kidney disease, the United States kidney care system has several entry
points for revision and improvement. The Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative put
forth by the Trump administration in 2019 aims to address several of these goals through a
variety of measures and payment models through the CMS. This Initiative will constitute the
largest change to this U.S. kidney care entitlement program since its creation in the 1970’s. The
two primary aspects of the initiative interrogated in this analysis are the End-Stage Renal Disease
Treatment Choices Model (ETC Model)17 and the Removing Financial Disincentives to Living
Organ Donation amendment to the National Organ Transplant Act.18

14

“OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network - OPTN,” accessed December 6, 2019,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/.
15
“FAQ About Medicare for Kidney Patients,” National Kidney Foundation, February 14, 2017,
https://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/faq-about-medicare-kidney-patients.
16
“V2 CH9 Healthcare Expenditures for Persons with ESRD,” 2.
17
“Regulations.Gov - Docket Folder Summary,” accessed November 19, 2019,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=CMS-2019-0101.
18
“Regulations.Gov - Proposed Rule Document,” accessed April 16, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HRSA-2020-0001-0001.

4

The primary goal of the ETC is to have 80% of all patients on home dialysis or have a
kidney transplant by 2030, and mandatory incentive and penalization systems for providers are
the primary mechanism used to accomplish this goal. These payment models also work towards
the goal of reducing the expenditures of the Medicare ESRD program. The Removing
Disincentives model reimburses living donors for costs such as lost wages, as well as the child
care and elder care they may need while going through the transplant procedure to donate to a
kidney patient. These reimbursements are meant to increase the number of living kidney donors
and thus the number of kidney transplants.
The goals of both of these aspects of the AAKH are consistent with examples,
recommendations, and research from other industrialized countries. However, especially in the
case of the ETC Model, these recommendations are taken too far, with high benchmarks and
extreme incentives that are unaccompanied by the education efforts and transitions needed both
to prepare patients and providers for this shift in treatment priorities and avoid adverse outcomes
(namely incentivizing treatments that may be inappropriate for many patients). In addition, the
Trump administration’s accompanying goal of reduced Medicare expenditures is cause for
suspicion. The CMS must walk a fine line between recognizing the dire need for drastic change
and implementing such changes too abruptly and without the proper precautions. The following
chapters will lay out the current circumstances of kidney disease in the United States and review
literature and models of kidney care by our industrialized counterparts. The final chapter is a
discussion of the extent to which the AAKH adequately and appropriately addresses the kidney
crises in the United States, whether it incorporates the best practices of global models, and how it
could best be improved.
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Chapter 2: Kidney Disease in the United States

2.1 Introduction to Kidney Disease in the United States
Before embarking on an analysis of Trump’s proposal, a thorough understanding of the
structure and make-up of the United States kidney care system is necessary. Within this system,
the journey of a kidney patient is a complicated one, both in the nature of the disease and the
means by which care is delivered and paid. This chapter aims to outline the larger context of
kidney disease in the United States, as well as the experiences of the patients themselves, by
illustrating the course and management of this disease.

2.2 Risk Factors and Diagnosis
Ideally, to detect the early and preventable stages of kidney disease, a patient’s annual
physicals with their primary physician would include lab tests that assess kidney function.
Patients who already have recognized risk factors for developing kidney disease — such as
diabetes, hypertension, family history of kidney disease, being older than 60 years, or being
African American— should be tested regularly to monitor whether they are showing signs of
early-stage CKD. (As discussed below, there are five stages of CKD.) Alternatively, patients
may come to a physician with symptoms such as foamy urine, headaches, fatigue, and loss of
appetite in order to be diagnosed. However, several factors prevent these opportunities for early
diagnosis from occurring.
In symptomatic patients, for instance, many symptoms do not appear until the later and
more severe stages of renal damage. Further, many symptoms, such as fatigue and headaches, are
so ambiguous that a physician might not immediately relate them to kidney disease. Thus, the
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best way to detect CKD is through routine diagnostic testing performed by primary care
physicians. However, this oftentimes does not happen in the United States. Populations that do
not have access to regular primary care check-ups, including uninsured, low-income, or those
simply without the time or opportunities to see their physicians, often miss these essential tests.
In 2016, the CDC estimated that only 54.6% of U.S. adults saw their primary care physician for
an annual visit.19 Consequently, it can be assumed that this proportion of U.S. adults also lost the
opportunity to be screened for symptoms of kidney disease, as well as for its risk factors, such as
diabetes and hypertension. Race is also a primary risk factor for CKD. End-Stage Renal Disease
prevalence is 3.7 times greater in African Americans, 1.4 times greater in Native Americans, and
1.5 times greater in Asian Americans than in whites.
2.2.1 Risk Factors and their Role in Prevention and Diagnosis
The two greatest risk factors for kidney disease are diabetes and hypertension. With 32%
of U.S. adults suffering from hypertension, and 9.5% of adults suffering from diabetes, a high
proportion of the United States adult population is already at risk for kidney disease. Both of
these conditions disproportionately affect non-white populations, with diabetes affecting 15.1%
of Native Americans and 12.7% of black populations compared to 7.4% of non-Hispanic
whites.20 Hypertension affects 54% of non-Hispanic black adults compared to 46% of nonhispanic white adults.21
The theoretical model in Figure 2.1 portrays how the clinical factors interact with social
determinants of health in the development of CKD. (In the figure, CVD stands for cardiovascular

19

National Center for Health Statistics, “FastStats,” October 11, 2019, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/physicianvisits.htm.
20
“National Diabetes Statistics Report | Data & Statistics | Diabetes | CDC,” February 18, 2020,
https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/data/statistics/statistics-report.html.
21
“High Blood Pressure Fact Sheet|Data & Statistics|DHDSP|CDC.”
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disease, DM refers to diabetes mellitus, and HTN is hypertension.) This model, taken from the
article “Social Determinants of Racial Disparities in CKD,” demonstrates the interactions
between these risk factors, which must all be addressed in order for the kidney disease
management to succeed.

Figure 2.1. Theoretical model of clinical and social determinants of CKD and ESRD, “Social
Determinants of Racial Disparities in CKD. - PubMed - NCBI,” accessed April 13, 2020,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=27178804&dopt
=Abstract.

2.2.2 Lab Diagnosis
Two tests are typically used to assess kidney disease: Glomerular Filtration Rate (eGFR)
and Urine Albumin. eGFR measures how well a patient’s kidneys are filtering blood by
measuring how much of the waste product creatinine is present as compared to the patient’s age,
race, sex and weight. The Urine Albumin test assesses the presence of the albumin protein,
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which only appears in urine when the kidneys are not properly filtering it. Both tests can indicate
the filtering effectiveness of the kidney.
The five stages of kidney disease represent the severity of damage to the kidneys, with
Stage 5 being complete renal failure. It is important to note that barring tests such as eGFR and
Urine Albumin, patients usually do not develop noticeable symptoms of kidney disease until
later stages, as the symptoms such as nausea, headaches, fatigue, limb swelling, and abnormal
urination can easily be mistaken for other health issues.
At Stage 1, eGFR is 90 or greater, meaning that the kidneys are still functioning, but at a
lower capacity than normal. At this stage, patients can make simple lifestyle changes to slow the
progression of kidney disease, such as exercise and diet changes that benefit blood pressure and
blood sugar levels. At Stage 2, eGFR drops to between 60 and 89, which means that the kidneys
are still functioning but other signs of damage are likely appearing, such as albumin protein in
the urine. By Stage 3, eGFR drops to between 30 and 59, meaning kidney function is decreasing,
while other symptoms may also be appearing, such as swelling in appendages, back pain, and
unusual urination. Since the kidneys at this stage are not doing their job of filtering wastes, other
bodily responses, such as high blood pressure, anemia, and bone disease may occur. At this
point, it is recommended that a patient see a nephrologist and dietician to take more drastic steps
to prevent further development of the disease; in some cases, patients and doctors may also need
to start planning for more advanced stages of the disease and care. Stage 4 occurs when eGFR is
between 15 and 30, meaning the kidneys are moderately to severely damaged and are only one
stage away from kidney failure. At this point, patients would ideally be meeting regularly with a
nephrologist, getting their kidneys checked frequently, and taking angiotensin-converting
enzyme (ACE) inhibitors to lower blood pressure and angiotensin receptor blockers (ARB) for

9

diabetes and high blood pressure management. Conversations with nephrologists will likely now
lean towards preparation for kidney failure treatment and the lifestyle changes that come with
such a transition.22
Once a patient has progressed to Stage 5, their eGFR is less than 15, and their kidneys
have failed. When a kidney has failed, it is no longer filtering waste out of blood, and a patient
requires either dialysis to filter blood for them or a kidney transplant. In the vast majority of
newly diagnosed cases in the United States, a patient’s kidney disease has already advanced to
later stages. As displayed in the graph below, fewer than 10% of patients diagnosed in 2012 were
aware of their kidney disease at Stages 1, 2, and 3; forty-five percent became aware at Stage 4 or
had progressed to Stage 4 and were rapidly approaching kidney failure. (Information in that
graph was based on data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey.)

Figure 2.2. NHANES Participants with CKD aware of their kidney disease, 2001-2012, “Kidney
Disease Statistics for the United States | NIDDK,” National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive
and Kidney Diseases, accessed December 6, 2019, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/healthinformation/health-statistics/kidney-disease
22

“Stages of Chronic Kidney Disease (CKD),” accessed December 6, 2019, http://www.kidneyfund.org/kidneydisease/chronic-kidney-disease-ckd/stages-of-chronic-kidney-disease/.
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2.2.3 Prevalence and Incidence
According to the United States Renal Data System (USRDS) report for 2018, there were
124,675 newly reported cases of End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) in 2016 and a total of
726,331 prevalent cases of ESRD in the U.S (crude prevalence of 2,160.7/million).23 Since 2011,
crude incidence has nearly plateaued, but the age-sex-race-standardized prevalence has risen by
20,000 cases per year, a trend that has continued since 2006. The USRDS attributes this upward
trend at least partly to the longer survival of ESRD patients in recent years, which has increased
the total population of living kidney disease patients. Other possibilities include the indirect
effects of the diabetes and obesity epidemics in the United States. (39.8% of adults in the U.S.
suffer from obesity,24 which is also a risk factor for CKD.)
Because so many people do not know they have kidney disease until the final stages, the
most common experience for patients is to discover their kidney disease status at the point of late
stage kidney failure, either from hospitalization for kidney failure or severe symptoms. Those
whose kidneys are no longer functioning (or may soon fail) receive a dialysis care plan, and they
are usually enrolled in Medicare for coverage of this costly treatment.

2.3 Medicare and ESRD
Ninety percent of patients with ESRD are enrolled in Medicare.25 In 1972, seven years
after the establishment of the Medicare program for the elderly in 1965, the National End-Stage

23

“V2 CH1 Incidence, Prevalence, Patient Characteristics, and Treatment Modalities,” accessed December 1, 2019,
https://www.usrds.org/2018/view/v2_01.aspx.
24
CDC, “Obesity Is a Common, Serious, and Costly Disease,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, February
27, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html.
25
“FAQ About Medicare for Kidney Patients,” National Kidney Foundation, February 14, 2017,
https://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/faq-about-medicare-kidney-patients.
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Renal Disease Program was established via Section 299I of Public Law 92-603.26 The creation of
this program was a result of requests from professionals and providers in the field to create a
coordinated system for ESRD patients, as well as a response to the discriminatory practices that
were being used to decide who could receive dialysis (see footnote).27, 28 This Medicare
entitlement program functions to cover the high-cost treatments required to keep ESRD patients
alive, and as an entitlement program is a guaranteed right for anyone diagnosed with ESRD.
In addition to offering coverage for ESRD patients, this program also serves to
coordinate care across the country among the various kidney disease service providers, including
nephrologists, dialysis companies, and hospitals. The Forum of ESRD Networks, a non-profit
organization that includes all ESRD Networks and was also established in the 1970’s, “facilitates
the flow of information and advances a national quality agenda with Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) and other renal organizations,” while also providing services such as
quality oversight, data collection, and technical assistance to ESRD providers.29 The care and
coordination of kidney disease in the United States is shared and organized across and among
these various programs.
Since the enactment of the National ESRD Program, the number of eligible patients has
grown from 10,000 patients in 1972 to 511,270 patients in 2016.30 At the same time, the
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“Fact Sheet: Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Network Organization Program” (Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, Office of Clinical Standards and Quality, June 18, 2012),
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Medicare ESRD coverage program expanded to include the 2011 CMS-implemented ESRD
Prospective Payment System (PPS), which “bundled Medicare’s payment for renal dialysis
services together with separately billable ESRD-related supplies ... into a single, per-treatment
payment amount.”31 This includes coverage for three or fewer dialysis treatments per week and
payment adjustments according to geographic area for “health care wages and facility sizes.” It
also reduced overall fees by 2%.32 No other major changes have been made to the system since
its establishment. As such, the proposed revisions to the kidney care system put forth by the
Trump administration will be the largest revamp of this system since its establishment.

2.4 Cost of ESRD in the United States
Seven percent of total Medicare spending is used for ESRD, despite ESRD patients
making up only 1% of the Medicare population.33 When combined with spending on CKD,
kidney patients account for 23% of the total fee for service Medicare spending.34 Put another
way, CKD spending in 2016 exceeded $79 billion, and ESRD spending exceeded $35 billion, for
a total of $114 billion in 2016. ESRD spending has been rising at a steady rate since 2004, at a
rate of about 4% most years, including 2016. In contrast, CKD spending increased by 23% since
2015, which “has primarily been driven by an increase in the number of identified cases,
particularly those in the earlier stages (CKD Stages 1-3)” according to the US Renal Disease
Data System (USRDS).35
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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The cost of kidney disease care and management varies by treatment type. Peritoneal
dialysis is the cheapest treatment, at $76,177 per year per patient. Hemodialysis, in contrast, is
$90,971 per year per patient. The treatment with the lowest cost, and the one associated with the
best outcomes and quality of life, is the kidney transplant, at $34,780. This is the most costeffective treatment, as most patients do not need to continue any form of treatment following the
procedure. It is for this reason that Medicare eligibility ends for patients that have received a
transplant and discontinued dialysis (36 months after the transplant).36
Overall, across the board government spending on kidney disease has increased in recent
years. Between 2011 and 2016, transplantation costs increased by 51%, while hemodialysis cost
increased by 78% for ESRD patients, in contrast to the 16% increase per capita in that same
period for general Medicare beneficiaries. One cause of this sharper increase in kidney disease
spending is pharmaceutical costs, with per patient per year pharmaceutical spending for kidney
beneficiaries being 4.1 times higher than for the general Medicare population.37 According to the
US Renal Data System, who published these findings, “the reasons for this disparity in drug cost
growth are unexplained.”38
2.4.1 Out of Pocket Costs for Patients
Under Medicare, approximately 80% of the costs for kidney disease treatment are
covered. More specifically, Medicare coverage for kidney disease is divided into three parts, two
of which are mandatory and one of which is voluntary. Part A of Medicare covers in-patient care,
such as that occurring in a hospital, nursing home, or hospice facility. Part B covers the majority
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Ibid, Figure 10.5a.
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“V2 CH10 Prescription Drug Coverage in Patients with ESRD,” accessed December 6, 2019,
https://www.usrds.org/2018/view/v2_10.aspx.
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of medical services for kidney patients, including dialysis and the necessary immunosuppressants required for transplantation. Parts A and B are mandatory when enrolled in
Medicare; Part D covers pharmaceuticals and is the only voluntary aspect of Medicare ESRD
coverage (i.e., patients may choose to opt-out of Part D if their employer-based insurance covers
pharmaceuticals already). 39,40 For kidney patients, out-of-pocket costs for pharmaceuticals are
lower as a proportion of total spending than their general Medicare population counterparts, but
because ESRD total costs are so much higher than other diseases, the actual amount spent by
ESRD patients is higher.
In terms of actual out-of-pocket costs incurred by ESRD patients, under Medicare
coverage, Part A covers the cost of kidney transplants or dialysis once the deductible of $1,408 is
met. Part B covers hospital fees for transplant surgeons, with a monthly premium of $134 in
2017, an annual deductible of $183, and a coinsurance of 20%. Similarly, outpatient dialysis and
home dialysis are covered under Part B, again with a 20% coinsurance.41
Medicare beneficiaries with kidney disease also qualify for the Low-Income Subsidy
(LIS), with a higher proportion of kidney patients receiving LIS (50.3%) than in the general
Medicare population (30.2%). The LIS significantly drops the price of pharmaceuticals under
Part D, with annual medication costs for non-LIS patients averaging at $1,091 versus $135 for
LIS patients.42
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“Medicare,” National Kidney Foundation, June 22, 2015, https://www.kidney.org/patients/medicare.
A note on the Medicare Donut Hole Coverage Gap: Kidney patients are vulnerable to the Donut Hole Coverage
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2.5 Treatment Options for ESRD in the United States
Once enrolled in Medicare, a kidney patient must decide which treatment option to
choose. In order to survive without a functioning kidney, they must begin a form of dialysis, and
if they wish, they can enroll for the kidney transplantation waitlist. Trends in distributions of
modality choices have remained relatively stable since 1980, as shown in Figure 2.4 from the
USRDS database, paralleling the overall increase in total treated ESRD cases. There have been
no significant changes in the suggested or preferred treatments in the U.S. over the past 40 years.
Outcomes of the three main forms of treatment (hemodialysis, peritoneal dialysis, and transplant)
have improved slightly since 1997. For hemodialysis, five-year survival rates have improved
from 0.30 to 0.35, with a more rapid gain witnessed for peritoneal dialysis at 0.29 to 0.41.
Transplantation survival rates have risen from 0.65 to 0.73. 43

Figure 2.4. Trends in the number of ESRD prevalent cases, by modality, in the US
population, 1980-2017, “2019 United States Renal Data System Annual Data Report:
Epidemiology of Kidney Disease in the United States” (USRDS, n.d.),
https://www.usrds.org/2019/view/USRDS_2019_ES_final.pdf..

43
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2.5.1 Dialysis
Patients can choose from two general types of dialysis — hemodialysis and peritoneal
dialysis — with options to perform the dialysis either in home or in a clinic setting. When faced
with the task of choosing which dialysis to embark on, patients have several factors to consider,
including price, lifestyle, proximity to dialysis centers, accessibility, support systems at home,
time, and more. Some patients weigh the expected life expectancy on the various forms of
dialysis against the option of receiving palliative care off dialysis as they make decisions about
care. According to the NKF, depending on a patient’s overall health, age, and medical
conditions, average life expectancy is 5-10 years on dialysis, although many patients can live up
to 20-30 years.44 Mortality rates differ between modalities, as do quality of life measures. On top
of this, professionals in the field will have opinions, and in some cases incentives, that affect
how they promote certain treatments over others.45
Whether a patient is primarily undergoing in-center dialysis or home dialysis, the dialysis
center is oftentimes the hub for the patient’s kidney care team, as it houses nephrologists, nurses,
renal dieticians, technicians, and social workers, especially if it is a hospital-based setting. If a
patient is conducting home dialysis, they are required to visit their care team at the center at least
once a month for lab work and general check-ins.
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“What Is Dialysis?” National Kidney Foundation, December 24, 2015,
https://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/dialysisinfo.
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2.5.1.1 In Center Hemodialysis

Figure 2.5. Hemodialysis Machine, “How Does a Hemodialysis Machine Work?,”
Fresenius Kidney Care, accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.freseniuskidneycare.com/ckdtreatment/what-is-dialysis/hemodialysis-machine.
In hemodialysis, a patient’s blood is filtered to remove waste and water with the support
of a machine called a dialyzer. While filtering, the system also controls blood pressure and
imports necessary minerals such as potassium, sodium, and calcium. Oftentimes, when
beginning hemodialysis, a patient also gets an arteriovenous fistula, which is an artificial
connection between an artery and a vein, implanted through a minor surgical procedure. This
allows for easier access to the veins for dialysis.46 Patients receiving dialysis in a dialysis center
generally need to go three times per week to remain comfortable and avoid kidney failure. Each
visit lasts approximately four hours, thus taking up approximately 12 hours of a patient’s
schedule each week, not including travel. When choosing a dialysis center, patients need to
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“Home Hemodialysis,” National Kidney Foundation, December 24, 2015,
https://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/homehemo.
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consider accessibility, proximity, transportation, and dialyzing shift schedules that work with the
patients’ schedules.

Figure 2.6. A patient connected to an in-clinic hemodialysis machine. “How Chronic
Kidney Disease Patients Can Reduce The Risk Of Bleeding-Out, Fistula Failure And Worse,”
KidneyBuzz, accessed April 21, 2020, https://www.kidneybuzz.com/how-chronic-kidneydisease-patients-can-reduce-the-risk-of-bleeding-out-fistula-failure-and-worse.
In the U.S., the majority of ESRD patients (63.1%) use hemodialysis. Ninety-eight
percent of these hemodialysis patients receive their treatment in a dialysis center rather than at
home.47 In 2015 there were 6,592 dialysis centers of varying categories in the U.S., including
private for-profit, non-profit, religiously affiliated, and government affiliated, some being located
in hospitals but many in individual locations. 48 The two largest dialysis companies are Davita
and Fresenius. Together they control more than 80% of the dialysis market; most of their
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revenues come from the clinics.49 The monopolies held by these companies, and the incentive to
profit from in-center dialysis, has been identified as a primary issue within the kidney care
system in the U.S.
2.5.1.2 Home Hemodialysis
A patient may also perform hemodialysis in their home. In order for this to be possible,
several factors are necessary. Before even starting this process, a patient must undergo training to
learn how to dialyze outside of a clinic and how to identify common problems such as infection.
In addition, patients need to set up a space in the home that is dedicated to the dialyzing process,
that can be kept sanitary to store supplies, and that has a water source for the machine. In some
cases, special electrical and plumbing systems also may be needed.
Such requirements can create a number of barriers for patients. Low-income patients, for
instance, may not be able to set up a dedicated space in their house or even have a stable housing
housing situation to begin with. In addition, it is highly recommended that the patient have a
caregiver in the home who is also trained to help with the process, referred to as a “care partner.”
This figure is not always present for many patients. Because there are no medical professionals
involved with in-home dialysis, anxieties over infection and error are a common barrier to
choosing and implementing this treatment. In addition to the barriers noted above, some patients
remain on in-center dialysis due to the “friendship and camaraderie” developed in the in-clinic
dialysis setting.50
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If a patient is trained and the proper accommodations are made in their home, however,
there are many aspects of in-home dialysis that may be preferable to in-center treatment. Patients
can dialyze more often when at home, for instance, as many as five to seven times a week, which
is associated with better outcomes and general quality of life.51 Many patients also feel more
comfortable receiving the treatment in their home. This is especially true for patients who have
mobility handicaps and would require transportation to in-center dialysis. Time constraints are
also alleviated, because the patient chooses the time of day they are dialyzing.
2.5.1.3 Peritoneal Dialysis
The third option for patients is peritoneal dialysis, performed outside of a clinic. Through
a minor surgery, peritoneal dialysis patients have a small catheter placed in their abdomen,
through which a sterile cleansing fluid is pumped into the belly. This fluid collects toxins and
wastes and is then drained. This can either be done through Continuous Ambulatory Peritoneal
Dialysis (CAPD) or Automated Peritoneal Dialysis (APD). CAPD is machine free (as shown in
Figure 2.7), and the actual detoxifying process occurs throughout the day, with the fluid being
drained periodically. The draining process is done four to five times in a 24-hour period, each
exchange taking about 30 to 40 minutes.
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Figure 2.7. CAPD machine-free peritoneal dialysis, “Peritoneal Dialysis | NIDDK,”
National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, accessed March 25, 2020,
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/kidney-disease/kidney-failure/peritoneal-dialysis.
Alternatively, the APD method uses a dialyzing machine that delivers and drains the fluid
automatically. Many patients opt to do this while they are sleeping, as shown in Figure 2.8.
Peritoneal dialysis is preferred for some patients due to the clear benefits for mobility and travel,
improved quality of life from frequent dialyzing, absence of needles, and the fact that the process
generally takes less total time than in-center hemodialysis. Some drawbacks of peritoneal
dialysis include that: it must be done every day; it may trigger body image issues related to the
catheter and fluid retention; it can cause difficulties in controlling blood glucose if the patient has
diabetes; it requires storage space and training time; and there is potential for an infection at the
entrance site of the catheter if it is not monitored properly.52, 53
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Figure 2.8. APD Nocturnal Peritoneal Dialysis, “What Is a Peritoneal Dialysis Machine? |
Fresenius Kidney Care,” accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.freseniuskidneycare.com/ckdtreatment/what-is-dialysis/peritoneal-dialysis-machine.
2.5.2 Palliative Care
With the mean age of the United States kidney disease population being 64.6, a
significant portion of kidney patients are considered elderly. Considering the comorbidities that
come with age and the progression of kidney disease, such as cardiovascular disease and
congestive heart failure, elderly patients tend to have less successful experiences with dialysis.
Additionally, the quality of life accompanying a rigorous dialysis treatment plan has proven to be
less favorable than a hospice style of care where palliative care is enacted. As defined by the
World Health Organization (WHO), palliative care is an “approach that improves the quality of
life of patients and their families facing the problem associated with life-threatening illness,
through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and...assessment
and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual.”54 Symptom
management in this case can include treating the effects of high blood pressure, heart disease,
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diabetes, depression, and anxiety, so that patients remain physically and emotionally
comfortable. Both hospice care and palliative care are covered under Medicare.
As cited in the 2015 study, “Palliative and end-of-life care issues in chronic kidney
disease,” research has found that for older and frailer patients, dialysis is not beneficial. Instead,
the authors found, conservative management of these patients’ symptoms allows for “better
preservation of function and quality of life and with fewer acute care admissions,” with many of
these patients actually living as long as those who did opt for dialysis. 55 Such findings that
dialysis may in fact worsen the symptoms for older patients make a strong argument for the
inclusion of hospice and palliative care in more discussions of care options.
2.5.3 Transplantations
For many patients, the gold standard for kidney disease treatment is a kidney transplant.
Patients who receive kidney transplants are more likely to live longer than those who remain on
dialysis (see Figure 2.9) and also are able in many ways to return to what life was like before
their diagnosis of kidney disease (as long as they maintained a healthy lifestyle to support the
new kidney, of course). Patients may receive a kidney from a deceased donor or from a living
donor with whom they are matched. Currently, 215,061 people are living in the United States
with a kidney transplant,56 making up 29.6% of all prevalent ESRD patients.57
Although transplantation is considered the optimal treatment, the process for receiving a
kidney transplant is long and complicated. In 2018, 21,167 kidney transplants were performed.
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However, as of December 4, 2019, 103,392 patients were on the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS) kidney waitlist, with an average wait time of five years.

Figure 2.9. Adjusted all-cause mortality by treatment modality for overall, dialysis, and
transplant, United States Renal Data System, “Chapter 5: Mortality” 2 (2018): 5.
UNOS is a private, non-profit organization contracted by the federal government to
manage organ donation and transplantation in the United States.58 The organization’s
responsibilities include maintaining the database of organ transplant data, monitoring organ
matching, and educating and providing assistance to transplant professionals on allocation
policies and procedures. When a patient is referred by their doctor for a kidney transplant and
passes the required physical, mental, and financial assessments, they can be added to this
national waitlist.59
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Organ Procurement Organizations (OPO’s) are non-profit organizations that help
coordinate the procurement, matching, and distribution of deceased donor organs in their
geographic regions. There are 58 OPO’s in the United States, all of which are administered by
UNOS. In order to increase their chances of receiving an organ, many patients list themselves
within multiple OPOs, not just the one in which they reside. Other patients are unable to access
multiple OPOs due to financial and other barriers, however, including not having the time to
travel to do consultations with transplant teams in other geographic regions. Patients listed in
distant OPOs must also have both the flexibility to travel there in a short period of time in the
event an organ becomes available and the means to leave at a moment’s notice.
When a deceased organ becomes available, the OPO must first determine the quality of
the donated kidney. Factors taken into account include age, blood type, cause of death, and
history of hypertension or diabetes. Once the kidney is deemed usable, the OPOs use their
database to determine who on the kidney transplant waitlist is a) a match with the donor and b)
scores the highest based on a series of factors regarding who needs the kidney first. Those factors
include age, how long they have been on the waitlist, and how long they have been on dialysis.60
Essentially, a standard of medical urgency is used to allocate the organ to the sickest patient
first.61
The living donor matching system also occurs through UNOS. Several regulations govern
the allocation of living organs. One critical piece of legislation to this research is the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984, which, alongside a ban on the sale of organ parts,
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forbids the exchange of organs for “valuable consideration.”62 NOTA, which also governs
OPO’s and UNOS, does not include in its definition of valuable consideration “the reasonable
payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages
incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.” For this
reason, grant programs in the United States such as the National Living Donor Assistance Center
(NLDAC) have provided reimbursements to a small number of living donors who require
assistance in order to mitigate the financial barriers associated with living donation. (This is
further discussed in the following section.)
Many patients conduct their own informal campaigns to find living donors, as seen below
in Figures 2.10 and 2.11. These campaigns urge family, friends, and community members to
become registered so that the patient may create a network of potential matches. The desperation
present in many of these campaigns stems from the long wait times for kidneys. While it varies
greatly by OPO, the current average wait time for a kidney is five years, although that wait time
may be shorter or longer depending on the locations in which the patient is registered.63 In 2014,
4,761 patients died while waiting for a kidney transplant, and 3,668 patients lost their places on
the waitlist after becoming too sick for a transplant. 64
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Figure 2.10. Kidney Hero Needed Lawn Signs, JASON SCHREIBER Union Leader
Correspondent, “For Sandown Man, Hunt for a Kidney Donor Is like Finding ‘Needle in a
Haystack,’” UnionLeader.com, accessed April 14, 2020,
https://www.unionleader.com/news/health/for-sandown-man-hunt-for-a-kidney-donor-is-likefinding-needle-in-a-haystack/article_64bf6ba9-27b6-59cc-9ce5-9055ded63f66.html.

Figure 2.11. Verna Needs a Kidney Billboards in Montgomery, Alabama, Samantha
Day, “Montgomery Woman Puts up Billboards in Hopes of Finding a Kidney Donor,”
https://www.wbrc.com, accessed April 14, 2020,
https://www.wbrc.com/2019/07/28/montgomery-woman-puts-up-billboards-hopes-findingkidney-donor/.
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Some patients are lucky enough to find a living donor who is both willing and able to
undergo the surgery. Twenty-eight percent of kidneys transplanted in 2016 came from living
donors, which are correlated with higher graft survival rates (and thus successful transplants)
than kidneys transplanted from deceased donors (98% and 93%, respectively).65 Kidney
transplantation surgeries are covered by the recipient’s insurance. In the case of Medicare, 80%
of the costs of kidney transplantation for the recipient are covered. While the living donor does
not incur any of the costs associated with the surgery itself, other costs naturally accrue, such as
lost time from work, child care, and general recovery time. This is a primary barrier to a larger
pool of living donors, and, as will be discussed in the following section, adversely affects certain
socioeconomic groups more than others.
2.5.3.1 Barriers to Transplantation in the United States
The United States currently operates under an “opt-in” organ donor system, meaning that
all people are presumed to not be organ donors, and therefore must register to become a donor.
This is opposed to “opt-out” systems that other countries use, where all residents are considered
donors unless they decide they do not want to be registered as such. Many see this as a primary
barrier to decreasing wait times and increasing kidney transplantations in the United States,
although transitions to such a system would be a large undertaking. Global models for this
transition are discussed in Chapter 3.
In the United States, lower-income populations face more barriers both to being living
donors and to finding living donors. If an ESRD patient is in a lower-income group, it can be
assumed that a significant portion of their family and friends will be in the same or similar
income group. Low-income groups are more at risk for diabetes, hypertension, tobacco use, and
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substance abuse, which are risk factors for kidney disease and also disqualifying factors for
becoming donors.
Because living donors are largely friends and family members, economic barriers are
particularly poignant for low-income patients’ potential living donor pool. Barriers such as lost
work hours and wages, as well as child care or elderly care costs incurred during the surgery and
recovery period, may prevent lower-income people from becoming living donors even if they
want to. Uninsured individuals also have more cause for concern as donors, due to the fact that
consequential post-donation complications may be deemed unrelated (and thus not covered
under the recipient’s insurance). This puts them in danger of incurring large medical bills. The
intricacies of this conundrum, as well as the possible solutions, will be analyzed in Chapters 3
and 4.

2.6 Discussion
In recent years, analysts, policy makers, and advocates have highlighted several aspects
of the kidney disease system that are in need of advancement and innovation. Issues in diagnostic
and prevention practices include the lack of community-specific interventions for at-risk
communities, as well as proper education initiatives that promote awareness of the disease. At
the treatment level, home peritoneal dialysis is considered to be underutilized, and
transplantation is a lengthy and complicated process that is not accessible to all patients.
Palliative care is also underutilized, especially given the large number of kidney patients who are
elderly, and the comfort palliative care can provide while maintaining similar mortality rates to
dialysis for many patients.
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But how do our global counterparts fare when it comes to the management and treatment
of kidney care? Notably, the United States has one of the highest mortality rates for kidney
dialysis patients in the world, at 21.7% in contrast to other industrialized countries and regions
such as Japan (6.6% mortality rate) and Europe (average of 15.6%).66 Studies have identified
several areas where the United States is particularly behind its global counterparts, including
compliance with treatment regimen, nutritional practices, staffing, care, and patient education,
despite our higher prevalence of kidney disease and higher government expenditures on kidney
disease. The following chapter will examine how comparable industrialized countries deliver
kidney care, and thus what may be learned from their care models.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review of Global Models and Research
3.1 Introduction
Worldwide, it is estimated that nearly two million people have End-Stage Renal Disease
(ESRD).67 However, the causes of this disease, the experiences of the patients, the treatments,
and the outcomes of the treatments vary widely globally. Diagnosis, prevention, and detection
are largely dependent on the health care and care coordination systems of each country, and
some countries face even larger barriers to successfully treating ESRD due to the genetic makeup
of their populations or broader ongoing health crises. Prevalence of ESRD varies 30 fold among
reporting countries, and the range of treatment options and preferences is equally wide.68 Certain
regions emphasize home dialysis, for instance, (especially peritoneal dialysis) at much higher
rates than the United States. In addition, some countries have succeeded in providing kidney
transplants to more of their kidney population than the US does, largely through revisions to the
organ donation system itself.
While the contrasts and ranges of experiences worldwide are complex, the circumstances
of ESRD in the United States are striking when compared to its global counterparts. Patients with
ESRD from the United States make up 29% of total prevalent cases worldwide, despite making
up only 4.25% of the world population. What is it that other industrialized countries are doing to
achieve lower rates of kidney disease, attain better outcomes, provide more transplants, and
manage care in more cost-effective ways?
Analysis of ESRD prevalence, treatment, and outcomes in the chapter consistently
focuses on three countries: Australia, Japan, and Canada. This is due to several factors, including
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the abundance of research from those three countries, their positions as models of efficacy in the
global kidney community, and their usefulness — as industrialized countries — in producing
comparative data for analyzing the United States’ own efficacy. Some analyses also incorporate
data from unique projects or circumstances in other countries, as well as relevant international
comparisons and research conducted in the United States.
3.1.1 State of the Field
For industrialized countries with solid health care systems, there remain a few universally
recognized priorities for improving kidney care. In developed countries, the growth of the
population aged 65 and older is an imminent issue in regards to the capacity of the healthcare
systems to manage their care. In addition, lack of routine testing for kidney disease has led to a
large population of undiagnosed people living with the disease worldwide. Lastly, kidney disease
is consistently incredibly costly, with high-income countries spending an average of 2-3% of
their health care budgets on the disease, despite the kidney disease populations representing on
average only 0.03% of their populations.69
Inconsistencies in data collection and the transparency of health care systems within
different countries pose challenges to international comparative research, but several
organizations and research teams have managed to make such comparisons a priority. For
example, the International Society of Nephrology is working to compile an ongoing Kidney
Health Atlas, a cross-sectional survey of 160 participating countries aimed at estimating the
“global burden of ESKD and capacity for care delivery across countries and regions.”70 The
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organization aims to provide international guidance and recommendations by synthesizing these
findings, while also providing crucial information to the kidney community at large. Thus far,
the ISN has published two summaries of their findings: the 2017 and 2019 Global Kidney Health
Atlases, which provide key findings on the current and predicted burdens of kidney disease
worldwide, as well as recommendations for both global leaders in kidney care and national
priorities in regards to kidney disease management. These recommendations include: increased
financing for ESRD prevention and management; increased multidisciplinary collaboration to
address workforce shortages; collection of quality indicators; expansion of health information
systems; and promotion of ESRD prevention and treatment by “implementing policies,
strategies, and advocacy and mitigating barriers.”71
All industrialized countries share these issues. In stark contrast to the United States,
however, other industrial countries have managed to reduce the prevalence of ESRD while
improving the management of the disease and both the quality of life and outcomes for its
patients. Whether these successes stem from superior health care structure and delivery,
utilization of different treatments, or some combination of the two, the United States stands to
learn much from other countries if it wants to improve conditions around kidney disease for its
citizens.

3.2 Global Burden of Kidney Disease
Incidence and prevalence rates of kidney disease are predictably varied across the world,
but the United States consistently ranks high in both categories. The United States ranks second
in incidence rate of treated ESRD (meaning newly diagnosed cases of ESRD), at 378 cases per
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million population, second only to Taiwan. At 2,196 ESRD cases per million population, the
United States’ prevalence rate (meaning the proportion of people who have the disease) ranks
third behind Taiwan and Japan.72 By comparison, 13% of countries have prevalence rates of
<500 per million population, although analysis of such low rates must always take into
consideration the possibility of underreporting.
Growth in kidney disease incidence rates over recent years must also be considered in
analyzing the global burden of kidney disease. While nearly half of all countries contributing to
the USRDS International Comparisons have reported relatively stable incidence rates of ESRD
since 2003, roughly 30% of countries had incidence rates that rose by two to four percent per
year, including the United States. The United States had a 2% increase in ESRD prevalence from
2003 to 2016.
For some countries, increases can be attributed to aging populations and higher rates of
diagnosis, which are often the result of awareness campaigns and screening projects. Thus, these
increases may be reflecting an increase in diagnosis and reporting, rather than an actual increase
in people suffering from kidney disease. This is considered to be the case in the United States.73
Notably, the United States also ranks 4th in incidences of treated ESRD attributed to diabetes as
the primary cause, with 176 cases per million population.
It is clear that the United States is outranking its global counterparts when it comes to
prevalence, while also being in the highest category of countries in terms of the rates of increase
of ESRD. The answer to these high rates lies partially in the upstream causes of kidney disease in
the United States.
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Figure 3.1. Global Prevalence of Treated ESKD, rate per million population for those over 18,
Bello AK, Levin A, Lunney M, Osman MA, Ye F, Ashuntantang G, Bellorin-Font E,
Benghanem Gharbi M, Ghnaimat M, Harden P, Jha V, Kalantar-Zadeh K, Kazancioglu R, et al.,
“GKHA.”.
3.2.1 Causes of Kidney Disease
The number one cause of chronic kidney disease worldwide is diabetes mellitus,74 with
the other leading causes being hypertension and obesity. Worldwide, the prevalence of diabetes
rose from 4.7 % in 1980 to 8.5% in 2014. The United States witnessed a more drastic increase;
its CKD prevalence grew from 2.54% in 1980 to 7.4% in 2014. The United States ranks third in
prevalence of diabetes and 4th in incidence of treated ESRD due to diabetes as the primary
cause.75,76 These numbers reflect the reality that the United States faces greater pressure due to
the connection between the diabetes epidemic and kidney disease rates than other countries.
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How does the cause of kidney disease differ in other countries? In the case of Japan, the
answer lies in a genetic predisposition of people of Japanese descent to have fewer nephrons (the
filtering agent of the kidney).77 It is for this reason that Japan consistently ranks above the
United States in incidence and prevalence. As Japanese Americans make up only 5.6% of the
U.S. population, their genetic predisposition can only partially explain the high rates in the
United States, although it is a reality to take into consideration. 78
Also important to the U.S. context is the fact that those of African descent are both
genetically at risk and more susceptible to ESRD. A 2011 study found that a particularly high
percentage of African Americans with non-diabetic ESRD have genes related to renal failure
susceptibilities.79 On top of this genetic foundation of susceptibility, African Americans are
disproportionately vulnerable to diabetes (11.7% of blacks have diabetes compared to 7.5% of
non-Hispanic whites).80 African Americans comprise 13.4% of the United States population, but
35% of all patients receiving dialysis in the United States, clearly showing that, the effects of the
diabetes epidemic, compounded with the presence of genetic predispositions, contributes to the
high prevalence rates of ESRD of the United States.81,82 Rates in African countries are
significantly lower than in the United States. This can be largely attributed to underreporting, but
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it remains the case that the disproportionate burden of diabetes, hypertension, and kidney disease
on African Americans cannot be solely explain by genetics.
As the industrialized country with the highest prevalence and incidence rates in diabetes
and second highest in ESRD, it is clear that the United States does not have a higher burden of
kidney disease merely due to underlying genetic reasons (as is the case with Japan). Rather, the
U.S. bears a greater burden of the worldwide diabetes crisis and, thus, also a greater burden of
the global ESRD crisis. The genetic susceptibility of certain population groups also contribute to
a smaller degree to this higher rate of ESRD (albeit on a smaller scale) as do disproportionate
rates of other comorbidities — such as diabetes and hypertension — in minority populations.
But once patients in the United States are diagnosed with ESRD, how do their
experiences in treatment differ from those in other industrialized countries?
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3.3 Treatments and Outcomes

Figure 3.2 “Percentage distribution of type of renal replacement therapy modality used by ESRD
patients, by country, in 2016”, USRDS “Chapter 11: International Comparisons” 2 (2018): 11.
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One of the starkest points of contrast in global experiences of kidney disease is that of
preferred treatment modalities. The above table displays the range of distributions of treatments
for kidney patients, from Japan with almost 90% of their population receiving in-center
hemodialysis to Norway having more than half their patients receive transplants. The United
States places in the middle range for most treatment options, contrasting with other countries that
rely heavily on one treatment or another in their national kidney agendas and consequently their
treatment distributions. While to a certain extent a range of treatment distributions is to be
expected, considering each treatment's merits for different patient populations83 such stark
differences should be seen primarily as a result of national kidney policies. As will be revealed in
this section, the distribution of treatments can be heavily altered by national agendas and
incentive programs.
In this next section, the individual merits of the treatments utilized by different countries
will be investigated along with the reasons for differing outcomes across treatments for kidney
patients by country. It will prove, once again, that the United States is an outlier when it comes
to utilization of several treatment options.
3.3.1 Dialysis Debates
According to the 2018 USRDS report, the most common ESRD treatment for 80% of all
countries was in-center hemodialysis, as it is in the United States.84 While variation in treatment
modalities is evident around the world, the variation in dialysis utilization worldwide is
particularly pronounced. This is especially the case with in-home versus in-center dialysis, with
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regions like the U.S. having low rates of home dialysis (12%) and others having rates as high as
74%, as is the case in Hong Kong.85
There are a variety of factors that can contribute to this range of dialysis distributions.
One primary factor is the cost of each dialysis, which itself varies across countries depending on
the cost of equipment (i.e., whether the equipment is manufactured in the country or imported).
In addition, with research constantly revealing the differing outcomes of the various dialysis
treatments, countries may push to adopt other dialysis treatments to improve patient outcomes
(or to reduce the costs associated with poor outcomes). Depending on these factors, governments
and health care systems can influence the utilization of their preferred treatment choices through
publicity campaigns and incentive systems, as the United States is attempting to do in the ETC
Model.
3.3.1.2 PD First Campaigns
One prime example of government campaigns to promote a single dialysis modality is the
string of “PD First” (meaning “peritoneal dialysis first”) campaigns seen across the Asian
Pacific, including in Hong Kong and Australia. In these campaigns, peritoneal dialysis is
promoted as the first suggestion to patients, with health care providers and government agencies
supporting this method of home dialysis collaboratively, largely for its merits as a “more
convenient and resource-conscious option” and, by extension, a cost-saver.86 In the case of Hong
Kong, their pioneering PD First campaign, which started in 1985, has led them to attain 74%
home dialysis utilization. This is a stark contrast to the United States.
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How do patient outcomes compare for in-home peritoneal dialysis compared to the incenter hemodialysis on which the United States most relies? In their 2013 article “Peritoneal
Dialysis First Policy Made Successful: Perspectives and Actions,” Philip Kam-tao Li and Kai
Ming Chow analyzed the ever-increasing number of countries pushing peritoneal dialysis as the
preferred modality of choice. The authors found that PD First campaigns led to improvements
including “patient survival, retain(ed) residual kidney function, lower infection risk, and
increase(d) patient satisfaction while reducing financial stress on governments.”87 In regards to
Quality of Life indicators, peritoneal dialysis patients reported “less illness intrusion, better renal
care, higher satisfaction, and the ability to travel.”88
In conclusion, the merits of peritoneal dialysis shine through especially in the realm of
cost savings and patient quality of life and autonomy. PD First campaigns are slowly spreading
across the world, and notably the Trump ETC Plan, while not explicitly calling itself a “PD
First” campaign, is based on similar goals.
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3.3.2 Transplantation

Figure 3.4.“Distribution of the percentage of kidney transplantations by kidney donor type and
country, 2016”, USRDS “Chapter 11: International Comparisons,” 11.
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Differences in transplantation rates, sources, and allocation systems are widespread
across the world, with the United States ranking on the lower end of the spectrum at 39 out of 61
reporting countries in 2016. While transplantation will always be limited by the sheer constraints
on supply, in 25% of the countries included in the US Renal Data Survey’s International Report
50% to 70% of treated ESRD patients are living with a kidney transplant.
The United States’ transplantation system differs from that of other countries in several
ways. As described in Chapter 2, the United States requires residents to opt-in to become a
deceased donor. Other countries, such as Spain, automatically register all residents to be organ
donors, and residents who do not want to be deceased donors must actively opt-out.89 The
United States also has what is considered a more cautious approach to organ harvesting. As
discussed later in this chapter, 18% of deceased kidneys processed in the U.S. were discarded in
2016, whereas in the European Union the average discard rate was only 10%.90 To put these
numbers in perspective, this means that 3,500 donated kidneys are discarded every year in the
United States.91
Of relevance when discussing global models for transplantation is the illegal and
unregulated international organ market and the issue of transplant tourism. Unfortunately, the
United States’ paucity of organs is not an issue isolated to our geographic boundaries, with
kidney patients constituting the largest proportion of those seeking transplants elsewhere. For
example, nearly two-thirds of kidney transplants performed in Pakistan were for foreigners.92
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This must be considered a direct consequence of the lack of organs in countries like the United
States, and the desperation of kidney patients that drives them to seek organs through illegal and
unethical routes. Thus, increases in available organs and reductions in waitlist times here could
result in benefits to those exploited and unfairly compensated in unsafe and unregulated settings
abroad.
The nuances of the organ harvesting systems and associated legislation are detailed in the
following sections, outlining the three main ways that other countries alter their transplant
systems to achieve higher transplant rates and reduce wait list times.
3.3.2.1 Opt-in vs. Opt-out Systems
While many countries in Europe, including France, Italy, and Spain, are opt-out organ
donation systems, the United States has remained in an opt-in system, despite several state-led
attempts to make changes. Legislators in New York, Delaware, and Colorado have failed in
passing opt-out legislation, due largely to protests from religious groups, such as the Orthodox
Jewish population of New York, or fears of encroachments on constitutional and personal rights.
Interestingly, the two prominent legislators who have pushed for presumed consent policies
either had kidney disease or had close family members with kidney disease in need of
transplants.93
Consistently, countries with opt-out systems have higher rates of transplantation than the
United States.94 In terms of the potential of an opt-out system to increase available organs and
thus organ transplant rates in the United States, predictions are varied. A recent study by the
University of Michigan found that the waiting list in the United States would only be marginally
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decreased if the country transitioned to an opt-out program. However, the secondary effects of
this waitlist reduction would be an exponential increase in the longevity of transplant recipients,
with kidney transplant candidates gaining the most life years out of any patient group.95
Another article from Stanford argues that countries with “no religious or cultural beliefs
that discourage organ donation” would be the prime candidates for transitions to opt-out systems
as a means of reducing waitlist times. As has been proven in the state-led attempts to transition to
presumed consent policies, following this recommendation the United States is not currently in a
place to make the transition due to the underlying beliefs of religious and political groups.96
3.3.2.2 Discard Rates
One contested subject in the realm of kidney transplantation is that of the criteria and
standard held for deceased donor kidneys. As mentioned earlier, the United States has a high
standard for donated kidneys and thus a higher discard rate than countries in the EU (18% versus
10%, respectively). The types of criteria that some countries are more lenient on than the United
States include factors such as the age of the donor. Transplantation specialists in Norway, which
has the highest transplant rate in Europe, argue that while the transplant success rates may be
lower with suboptimal donations, those organs still may be adequate fits for older patients.97, 98
The risks of transplanting a suboptimal kidney are also seen as lower than the risks of remaining
on dialysis, especially for elderly patients. As Dr. Díez Nicolás notes, key to the legislation of
such changes in organ standards is the fact that these “extended criteria” oftentimes “require

95

Luke J. DeRoos et al., “Estimated Association Between Organ Availability and Presumed Consent in Solid Organ
Transplant,” JAMA Network Open 2, no. 10 (October 2, 2019): e1912431–e1912431,
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.12431.
96
“‘Opt Out’ Policies Increase Organ Donation | SPARQ,” accessed April 23, 2020,
https://sparq.stanford.edu/solutions/opt-out-policies-increase-organ-donation.
97
Anna Varberg Reisaeter et al., “The Kidney Transplantation Program in Norway since 2000,” Clinical
Transplants, 2011, 111–18.
98
V. Díez Nicolás et al., “713 Kidney Transplant Activity in Europe during 2014: Differences among Countries,”
European Urology Supplements 15, no. 3 (March 2016): e713, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-9056(16)60715-7.

46

additional consideration and specific consent by the recipient.”99 Yet as in the case of opt-out
systems and incentivization strategies, the details of such policies are what can make the
difference between ineffective and dangerous policies and those which are effective and lifesaving.
3.3.2.3 Living Donors
Some countries have attempted to increase overall transplants by increasing the number
of living donors. This has primarily been successful through reimbursement strategies and other
reward systems for the living donors. Living donor pools are seen by some as an underutilized
resource for U.S. kidney patients, and indisputably the short-term and long-term outcomes are
better with living donor kidneys than deceased donor kidneys.100,101
As the United States prepares to implement similar changes in the Trump ETC plan, both
the benefits and dangers of such programs must be weighed. Key to that analysis are the
circumstances of living donations. First, the recognized issue these programs aim to address is
that there are people that would be willing to be living organ donors if they were not
experiencing certain “disincentives.” These disincentives include but are not limited to: fear of
death or disability; fear of lost opportunity (to donate to others who might need an organ in the
future, like their children); and financial disincentives (about matters ranging from lost work
hours to child care).102 Another important consideration is the motivations guiding most living
donors. These types of donations today most often come from family, friends, or the patient’s
immediate community, for the obvious reasons that those close to the patient want them to live
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and live well. In the more rare circumstances where a patient manages to find a stranger willing
to be a kidney donor, the motivation is currently altruistic rather than financial
Considering the above circumstances, strategies to increase the number of living donors
could work in three ways. The first would be to increase the number of purely altruistic
donations, by somehow inciting selfless and philanthropic urges in the population. The second
would be to limit the disincentives to donating, thereby expanding the population that would
donate if they could, such as by reimbursing lost wages. The third would be an outright incentive
— i.e., a monetary or alternative reward that goes beyond reimbursement — so as to “improve
the donor’s circumstances” (i.e., tax credits, tuition or job training, or payments). This option is
limited under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984, which prohibits the transfer
of a “valuable consideration” to the living donor (see footnote 103). If NOTA were to be
amended, such programs would function to expand the portion of the population that would not
donate unless they were not only reimbursed but rewarded.104 However, despite the presence of
the valuable consideration clause, reimbursement programs hold the potential to border on
coercion for those in poor economic conditions.
Israel is one country that attempted to increase living donations through reimbursement
strategies. In 2008, Israel implemented a policy where registered donors were given priority if
they later were in need of an organ themselves (this was informally dubbed a “don’t give, don’t
get” policy). This can be considered an incentivizing (reward) system, although in this case the
incentive is not monetary and only really constitutes a reward if the donor ends up needing an
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organ later in life. This policy also included reimbursement measures and social support services
for living donors. The results of this initiative were deemed successful, with the organ donation
rates increasing from 7.8 to 11.4 donors per million by 2011.105
The American Society of Transplantation (AST) and American Society of Transplant
Surgeons (ASTS) convened a workshop in 2014 to address the above issues. In their final
statement, upon review of relevant research, workshop organizers stated:
“We believe it important not to conflate the illegal market for organs, which we reject
in the strongest possible terms, with the potential in the United States for concerted
action to remove all remaining financial disincentives for donors and critically consider
testing the impact and acceptability of incentives to increase organ availability in the
United States.” 106
The workshop participants also concluded that it remains committed against valuable
consideration and that they do not support “any trials of direct payments or valuable
considerations to donors or families based on a process of market- assigned values of organs.”
Some researchers have made the argument for the amendment of NOTA’s valuable
consideration clause, claiming that it would be to the benefit of those on organ waitlists to
legalize payments to living organ donors, while also mitigating the effects of the U.S.’s organ
shortage on developing countries. In her article “Payment for living organ donation should be
legalised,” Amy Friedman argues that considering the toll of the illegal organ harvesting market
in the developing world, drastic amendments to the acquisition of consensually obtained organs
in the United States must be taken.107 She claims that “it is appropriate that living donors,
indigent or wealthy, share in the tangible benefits of their ethical concern for others.” Some
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economists also make claims to the argument for altering the valuable consideration ban.
Authors of the 2018 study “Would Government Compensation of Living Kidney Donors Exploit
the Poor?” conducted an empirical analysis of the consequences of a government incentive of
$75,000 for living donors. They argue that the primary argument against incentive systems, that
it would exploit poor populations, “overlooks the fact that many poor patients desperately need a
kidney transplant and would greatly benefit from an increased supply of kidneys.”108 To this
point, they find that the net benefit from kidney transplantation to low-income populations would
increase from $1 billion to $12 billion per year. They argue that at $75,000 for a kidney, the
donor would be receiving the “fair market value of their kidney, and hence would not be
exploited.”
To address the potential of exploitation or negative consequence on low-income living
donors, The Working Group on Incentives for Living Donors emphasizes the reality of the
demographics of both kidney patients and donors in the U.S. in their article “Incentives for
Organ Donation: Proposed Standards for an Internationally Acceptable System.”109 The authors
explain that because U.S. kidney patients are already from lower economic groups, their lowincome friends and family donors would constitute a larger portion of the overall living donor
population. This raises the question of whether low-income status should be a contraindication to
living organ donation. However, the authors argue that the selection process of organ donation is
already very cautious in order to avoid complications or poor outcomes for donors. As such,
those who are not in sufficient health are not selected to be donors. Low-income people have
higher rates of diabetes and obesity, they continue, so we can assume potential low-income
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donors are often rejected due to diabetes and obesity. In this complicated intersection of factors,
the authors conclude that unless disproportionate poor outcomes started to present themselves in
the low-income donors that are in a healthy enough state to donate, the potential for creating a
coercive market for organs from poor populations is not high. In addition, because a
reimbursement system would mostly work to utilize those willing (family and friends) but unable
(lost wages) to donate, it would not drastically change the makeup and motives of low-income
living donor populations. Lastly, they conclude, removing disincentives could result in net
positive changes to these populations, as was also cited by the authors of “Would Government
Compensation of Living Kidney Donors Exploit the Poor?”
In other cases, altruism is seen as a triumphing strategy over financial incentives as well
as a means to mitigate the dangers of coercive incentivization strategies. For instance, in his
book The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, Richard Titmus argues that
altruism (the blood donation model used in the UK) is not only more economically efficient for
inspiring blood donation than financial incentives, but also less likely to induce unwanted
effects.110 His argument provides an interesting theoretical model for considering altruism versus
incentives, but the comparison is not entirely apt, as blood donation, unlike kidney donations,
does not involve for-profit entities, and kidney transplantation involves much more invasive
surgical processes than giving blood.
In sum, the case for reimbursements and incentives schemes as tactics to inspire living
donations is mixed. Since examples from our global counterparts are limited, speculative
analysis remains the primary resource for weighing their potential benefits and drawbacks. As
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such, case by case scrutiny of the motives, means, and execution of such legislation is prudent, as
will be done in the case of the Trump model in the following chapter.
3.3.3 Overall ESRD Outcomes
The United States consistently ranks lower than its global counterparts in measures of
outcomes of kidney disease. Mortality rates and outcomes differ for all treatments, just as overall
patient mortality differs across countries. The Dialysis Outcomes and Practice Patterns Study
found that crude one-year mortality rates were 6.6% in Japan, 15.6% in Europe, and 21.7% in the
United States. Even with adjustments for age, gender, race, and 25 comorbid conditions, the
relative risk (RR) for mortality was 2.84 for Europe compared with Japan and 3.78 for the United
States compared with Japan.111
The reasons behind the United States’ poor performance when it comes to outcomes has
previously been explained by lower dialysis rates, but recent research consistently highlights the
role of the comorbidities to which US. patients are prone.112 According to the 2007 article, “Why
Is the Mortality of Dialysis Patients in the United States Much Higher than the Rest of the
World?”113 differences between outcomes for facilities within the United States vary greatly and
the lack of uniform patterns of practice may be to blame. When comparing clinical practices of
vascular access initiation, compliance with treatment regimen, nutritional practices, staffing,
care, and patient education, the level of care in the United States was far below that of other
countries. The paper concluded that such inconsistencies in practice patterns in the United States
could also account for such drastic differences in mortality rates globally. It can also be assumed
111

Robert N. Foley and Raymond M. Hakim, “Why Is the Mortality of Dialysis Patients in the United States Much
Higher than the Rest of the World?,” Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 20, no. 7 (July 1, 2009): 1432–
35, https://doi.org/10.1681/ASN.2009030282.
112
“USRDS,” accessed April 22, 2020, https://www.usrds.org/atlas09.aspx.
113
Robert N. Foley and Raymond M. Hakim, “Why Is the Mortality of Dialysis Patients in the United States Much
Higher than the Rest of the World?,” Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 20, no. 7 (July 1, 2009): 1432–
35, https://doi.org/10.1681/ASN.2009030282.

52

that because the rates of kidney transplants are lower in the United States than in other
industrialized countries, U.S. patients are missing out on the significantly higher outcomes
associated with transplantation.
3.3.3.1 Quality of Life
Just as outcome factors such as mortality rates are drastically different between countries,
so too does the perceived burden of kidney disease by patients themselves vary globally.
Unfortunately, research focused on the global differences in the perception of the disease by the
patients themselves is sparse, and studies of the relationship between patients’ perceptions and
their actual physical functioning tend to be contradictory.
In one Japanese study, for instance, hemodialysis patients reported a greater burden of
kidney disease than did patients in the United States or Europe. However, while the perceived
burden was higher, actual physical functioning using the Kidney Disease Quality of Life
(KDQOL) scale114 for Japanese patients was higher than patients in the United States and
Europe.115 The reason for this difference was not identified in this paper, but future studies may
reveal why there are such stark differences in patient perception versus physical outcomes.
In contrast, an Australian study using the Australian diabetes, obesity, and lifestyle
longitudinal study explored the relationships between progression of CKD, quality of life, and
outcomes (including physical component summary scores and mental component summary
scores).116 These researchers found that physical but not mental quality of life is “significantly
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impaired” in chronic kidney disease and worsens with the progression of the disease. This is
nearly the opposite in Japan, where mental well-being and subjective quality of life measures
were low even when physical functioning was high and mortality rates were low. No such
quality of life data exists for American kidney patients compared with kidney patients in other
countries. This sparsity of data, combined with contradictory findings within the data that does
exist, make clear the need for an international analysis of quality of life measures related to
kidney disease so as to better identify the aspects of care systems that improve (or worsen) the
mental effects of kidney disease.

3.4 Costs
3.4.1 Overall Health Care Costs
The United States government currently outspends all other high-income countries when
it comes to health care (see Figure 3.5), but still underperforms when it comes to quality and
access of care. In their 2018 article, “Health Care Spending in the United States and Other HighIncome Countries,” Irene Papnicolas et al used OECD data to interrogate these discrepancies in
both cost and quality as compared to other high-income countries.
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Figure 3.5. Health Spending per capita in U.S. dollars, 2018 or latest available data,
“Health Resources - Health Spending - OECD Data,” theOECD, accessed April 14, 2020,
http://data.oecd.org/healthres/health-spending.htm.
The study authors found that the United States spends almost double per capita on health
care than other countries, spends more than any other country on pharmaceuticals, and has the
lowest insured population. Some aspects of that high spending stand out especially from our
counterparts, such as the fact that 8% of this country’s total spending goes to governance and
administration, as compared to the mean of 3% in other countries. The U.S. also has high rates of
specialists compared to the low availability of primary care physicians, as well as relatively high
levels of administrative burden on these physicians — despite the already high proportion of
spending allocated to administration.
Given the exorbitant amount of money spent on health care, one might expect that care to
be more readily available and of a higher quality than in other countries. Instead, according to the
2018 study “Health Care Spending in the United States and Other High Income Countries,”117
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the United States again ranks below its counterparts. The study found that United States survey
participants experienced the lowest satisfaction with the health care system (19% compared to a
mean of 45%), for instance. The study also found that a greater percentage of U.S. participants
thought the entire health care system needed to be rebuilt than in any other country surveyed
(23% compared to a mean of 8%). In terms of access and equity, the U.S. also had the highest
proportion of unmet need in the population, and the highest out of pocket spending as a
percentage of total national health spending.
That same 2018 study concluded that prices of physician and hospital services,
pharmaceuticals, and diagnostic tests were the main drivers of high health spending in the U.S.,
affecting not only the cost of health care but also access to care. The authors found that the most
efficient places to target spending adjustments would be to reduce pharmaceutical prices and
administrative costs. A subsequent study published in 2019 found that waste in health care
spending could account for 25% of total health care spending, with these reductions coming
mostly from the realm of care coordination and “administrative complexity.”118
3.4.2 ESRD Costs
The economics of kidney disease, which includes health care expenditures and costs
borne by patients, differ across industrialized countries. The average proportion of total health
care spending by high-income countries on kidney disease is 2% to 3%.119 Kidney disease
constitutes 23% of Medicare spending in the United States,120 with all of Medicare spending
constituting 20% of national health care spending. With the United States spending almost
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double that of its global counterparts on overall healthcare, the United States outspends on
kidney disease both in terms of the proportion of spending on kidney disease and total spending
per capita on kidney disease.
Within each country, the relative costs of each treatment varies due, in turn, to
differences in factors such as pharmaceutical prices, hospitalization costs, import costs for
foreign materials, and prices of equipment. For example, the “Perspectives” article found that in
many countries peritoneal dialysis was 10% to 30% less expensive than hemodialysis
(specifically, in China PD was 10% cheaper, in Nepal it was 30% cheaper, and in South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand it was 20% cheaper). The Trump ETC model predicts that an increase in
peritoneal dialysis would lead to cost savings such as those observed in the former countries, due
to its lower comparative cost per patient.
As stated in previous sections, and as witnessed in all realms of public health, prevention
and detection of kidney disease at early stages is one of the most effective ways to reduce total
expenditures on CKD and ESRD. By catching the disease early and eliminating the need for
expensive treatments, costs for both patients and the health care system go down.

3.5 Differentials in Access and Equity of Care
The one area where these industrialized countries universally struggle and require
improvement, including the United States, is in the differentials in access and equity of care.
Around the world, minorities and disadvantaged populations consistently have higher rates of
ESRD, lower transplant rates,121 and poorer outcomes. In Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
this is particularly true of indigenous populations (Canadian indigenous populations, for
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instance, are three times as likely to develop ESRD as white populations).122 Similarly, in the
United States, African American populations are 3.4 times as likely to develop ESRD and Native
Americans are 0.5% times more likely to develop the disease than white populations.123
Reasons for such disparities stem largely from differentials in comorbidities, lack of
access to primary care (and, therefore, early diagnosis), and myriad other socioeconomic factors,
although each country’s populations also experience unique barriers. One Australian article, for
instance, also identifies the “ongoing reality of colonisation, and silence about its implications”
as a fundamental cause.124 Such implications include persistent structural violence against
minority groups, which negatively impacts their access to and quality of health care.
The task of addressing structural health care inequities is a daunting one for many
countries, but must be seen as a priority. Although research into variable outcomes and initiatives
to address them exist around the world, effective and real change remains a consistent need, one
that will take a concerted effort. How the Trump ETC Model recognizes and addresses this issue
will be discussed in the following chapter.

3.6 Lessons from Global Kidney Care
In sum, the United States underperforms in nearly all areas of kidney care compared to
other industrialized countries and in some cases to non-industrialized countries. Currently,
United States ESRD patients make up 29% of total prevalent cases worldwide, despite making
up only 4.25% of the world population, due largely to the high rates of diabetes in this country.
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In regards to treatment, in-home peritoneal dialysis is underutilized compared to other countries
that have made large strides in transitioning to it as a means for reducing costs and improving
patient outcomes. The United States also falls behind when it comes to transplant rates, as a
country with an already small donor pool due to our opt-in system, high discard rates, and low
utilization of living donation. Outcomes of dialysis treatment are also worse than other industrial
countries, at 21.7% one year mortality compared to 15.6% in Europe. Moreover, the United
States underperforms in all the above categories despite high expenditures in both overall health
care costs and kidney care costs.
Faced with the reality that the United States is underperforming compared to other
industrialized countries in essentially all aspects of prevention, treatment, and outcomes of
ESRD, the Trump administration has released a proposal to alter the current U.S. kidney care
system, discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative
By this point, one should need no convincing that the United States kidney care system is
in need of improvement and revision. This chapter will analyze two primary components of the
American Kidney Health Initiative launched by the Trump administration this past year, the End
Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices Model (ETC Model) and the Removing Financial
Disincentives to Living Organ Donation proposal, both of which aim to make such
improvements.
In both cases, the final version of the proposed rules have yet to be released. Indeed, in
the case of the ETC model, the final rule is four months late. As such, this analysis is based off
of the proposed rule documents released on the Federal Registrar page for the notice and
comment period.

4.1 Introduction to the AAKH
On July 10, 2019, President Donald Trump and his administration launched the
Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative (AAKH) via an executive order signed by the
president that same day. The initiative, originally set to begin in January of 2020, outlines a
multifaceted approach to addressing the kidney disease crisis in the U.S. and includes a range of
strategies, including prevention programs, artificial kidney research, and several payment models
aimed at incentivizing shifts in care practices.
The release of this initiative was announced in a special event hosted by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Resources Services (HHS), with introductory remarks by
Secretary of the HHS, Alex Azar. Secretary Azar, whose father suffered from kidney disease,
stated, “President Trump is tackling the toughest issues in American healthcare, and few areas
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need reform more than the way we treat kidney disease”125 Following his speech, President
Trump discussed the motivations and sentiment behind the administration's focus on kidney
disease. Standing in front of a dozen advocates and patients of the kidney disease community,
the President outlined the plan and the immediate steps to be taken by the administration in the
following months and years.126
The initiative has three primary goals, each of which, in turn, has objectives that serve as
benchmarks. The goals and objectives are enumerated in the Advancing American Kidney Health
paper released alongside the announcement by the HHS, which provides an executive summary,
goals, and objectives for the initiative, along with a list of the strategies set forth by HHS.127
Some goals build off previous initiatives and projects of the HHS. These will serve as either
models or will be broadened within AAKH.
The first goal of the executive order is to “reduce the risk of kidney failure.” This goal
encompasses all initiatives involving prevention and detection, as well as educational programs
that target high-risk populations. The two objectives within the section are 1) “advance public
health surveillance capabilities and research to improve identification of populations at risk and
those in early stages of kidney disease” and 2) “encourage adoption of evidence-based
interventions to delay or stop progression to kidney failure.”128 As a benchmark, the AAKH aims
to reduce the number of Americans developing ESRD by 25% by the year 2030.
The second goal of the AAKH is to “improve access to and quality of person-centered
treatment options.” This encompasses efforts to provide more treatment options for patients,
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including encouraging home dialysis and transplantation and promoting artificial kidney
research.
The first objective of this goal is to “improve care coordination and patient education for
people living with kidney disease and their caregivers, enabling more person-centric transitions
to safe and effective treatments for kidney failure.” The second objective is to “introduce new
value-based kidney disease payment models that align health care provider incentives with
patient preferences and improve the quality of life.” The initiative lays out four voluntary
payment models and one mandatory payment model, released by the CMMI (the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation created under the Affordable Care Act) as a proposal to the
Federal Registrar on July 11. Mandatory payment models are ones that physicians and facilities
can opt to participate in, whereas the mandatory model is required of half of all facilities in the
United States. As is the case with most CMS voluntary payment models, these voluntary models
include more favorable incentives and allow for more flexibility in where providers choose to
implement redesigns to care. In contrast, the mandatory payment model requires providers to
participate, and includes more negative payment incentives. The four voluntary payment models
are the: Kidney Care First (KCF), Comprehensive Kidney Care Contracting (CKCC), CKCC
Professional, and CKCC Global programs, all meant to incentivize the goals of the AAKH
through more streamlined management of the kidney disease system. The only mandatory
payment model is the End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment model, which will be discussed
further in Section 2.3 and will be the primary payment model analyzed in this work.
The final objective under this goal is to “catalyze the development of innovative therapies
including wearable or implantable artificial kidneys with funding from government,
philanthropic and private entities through KidneyX, and coordinating regulatory and payment
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policies to incentivize innovative product development,” as well as easing access to home-based
forms of care and transplants.129 As a benchmark for this goal, by 2030 the HHS aims to have
80% of ESRD patients receiving home dialysis or a transplant, a goal that would be primarily
achieved through the mandatory payment model.
The third and final goal of the initiative is to increase access to kidney transplants. The
two objectives under this goal are to “increase the utilization of available organs from deceased
donors by increasing organ recovery and reducing the organ discard rate” and to “increase the
number of living donors by removing disincentives to donation and ensuring appropriate
financial support.”130 Within the AAKH, the proposed Removing Financial Incentives to Living
Organ Donation initiative addresses these objectives, as discussed further in section 2.3.8.

4.2 Initial Responses to the AAKH
Upon the announcement of the executive order, news outlets, kidney organizations, and
government agencies released their summaries and initial reactions. Reactions were largely
positive, with many professionals and reporters surprisingly impressed with the scope of the plan
released by the Trump administration. This surprise stemmed in part from the hostility of the
administration toward the Affordable Care Act (ACA), some aspects of which (e.g., the CMMI)
are necessary for the AAKH to function. However, many of these positive reactions were
tempered with doubt, due primarily to the immensity of the plan and questions as to whether the
benchmarks were realistic.
The HHS press release summarized the executive order and also noted the department's
immediate action items following the order. Agency officials stated in this press release that in
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the following week they would be commencing several “immediate actions,” which included the
release of the payment models by the CMMI. These models would include “new incentives for
preventing kidney disease and managing kidney patients’ health in a more comprehensive and
person-centered way.”131 The incentives would largely be monetary, and in the case of the
mandatory payment model would include both rewards and penalties. These payment models,
including the mandatory model released by the CMS on the Federal Registrar, would comprise
the largest and most immediate changes of the AAKH. As of the time of this press release, they
were set to begin in January of 2020. However, in the case of the mandatory ETC Model, final
legislation has yet to be released (as of April 2020).
Among news outlets that initially covered the order were NPR and The New York Times.
Both outlets’ coverage included responses from experts and researchers in the field of kidney
health, as well as members of previous administrations’ health departments. NPR’s Selena
Simmons-Duffin and Carmel Worth interviewed Dr. Holly Mattix-Kramer, who commended the
intentions of the AAKH, speaking for other members of the kidney community by saying,
“‘We're extremely excited...for so long we felt like no one was paying attention to this epidemic
of kidney disease.’"132 Dr. Mattix-Kramer also targeted the previous payment structures as one
part of the problem, asserting that while there were payment structures in place once a patient
reached kidney failure, previously there had been no incentivizing payment structures for
prevention. President Obama’s previous head of CMS, Andy Slavitt, was also quoted in the
article, affirming the recognized need for such legislation in stating that the “care of kidney
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patients has been broken in the US for a long time, plagued with a corporate duopoly [and] a
lower income minority population losing out.”
The sentiment of these two was echoed by those interviewed in a New York Times article
written by Reed Ableson and Katie Thomas.133 Dr. John Sedor, a doctor at the Cleveland Clinic
and consultant for several federal programs, noted, “‘dialysis has been a wonderful technology,
but it has suffered from little innovation.’” In the article, Tonya Saffer of the National Kidney
Foundation (NKF) also remarked that “‘We are very optimistic and excited that there is great
attention at the presidential level,’” then added, “‘it’s really been four decades since anybody has
paid attention to this space in a very meaningful way.’”
While many key figures in the kidney community commended the announcement,
however, several were wary of the immensity of the undertaking. Both Dr. Mattix-Kramer and
Slavitt expressed qualms about the order’s viability. Dr. Mattix-Kramer was especially worried
about the program’s ambitious benchmark of having 80% of patients on home dialysis or
transplanted by 2030, which she thought to be overambitious. For many of her patients, she said,
socioeconomic circumstances have and could continue to make the transition to home dialysis
difficult or impossible, for such basic reasons as, “‘you need social support and you need a clean
house and you need someplace to have equipment.’” Slavitt worried especially about a
misalignment between this proposal and other objectives of the Trump administration. In a tweet
quoted in the NPR article, he noted:
"There is one law that makes this new change possible. The same law that requires
people with [preexisting] conditions get coverage. The ACA, without it, there is no
authority to do this."134
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Many large kidney organizations released responses to the DHHS press release and
President Trump’s executive order. The National Kidney Foundation (NKF), for instance, one of
the leading organizations in kidney patient support, advocacy, and research, announced their
support of the initiative, especially due to the “alignment of the initiative with NKF’s public
policy priorities in areas of improving kidney disease awareness.”135
The two largest for-profit dialysis companies, DaVita and Fresenius, also remarked on
the announcement. Notably, both companies have historically profited off the large portion of
ESRD patients that dialyze in their centers. In DaVita’s press release, company officials stated
that they were “encouraged” and “excited” about the changes to come with the AAKH.136 (They
also noted their own position in the market for home dialysis.) As the largest provider of home
dialysis equipment in the U.S., Fresenius’s press release stated that “the company's execution of
its home strategy is additionally supported by the Executive Order on Advancing Kidney
Health.”137
Notably, the announcement of the AAKH also spurred changes to investment in dialysis
companies, especially DaVita and Fresenius. Prior to the announcement, fears of negative
repercussions on the two companies caused investors to withdraw, with a resultant 5% drop in
stock prices for both companies on the day of the announcement. Both rebounded by the
following day, however, as the order was not as severe as had been feared by the companies and
their investors, especially considering their burgeoning home dialysis equipment production
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programs. Indeed, in a statement to CNBC, health policy research analyst Chris Meekens stated
that “the encouragement to build out home [dialysis] and the penalty for not building out is not
as great as we thought would be necessary to spur that to quickly change behavior.” 138

4.3 End Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices Model (ETC Model)
In recognition of the issues stated in the previous two chapters, especially that of the
underutilization of in-home dialysis and transplantation in this country, the mandatory payment
model (ETC Model) included in the AAKH aims to improve increased utilization of both
treatment options. The model also addresses the issue of the high costs of kidney disease
treatment, by incentivizing the cheaper treatment options of home dialysis and transplantation
through incentive strategies for physicians in an effort to reduce Medicare expenditures on
kidney disease.
4.3.1 Introduction
The AAKH’s mandatory payment model was released as a proposed rule by CMS and
HHS on July 18th, 2019 on the Federal Registrar entitled “Medicare Program; Specialty Care
Models To Improve Quality of Care and Reduce Expenditures” (otherwise known as the ETC
Model). The notice and comment period were set to remain open until September 16, 2019, and
the final model was set to begin in January 2020. 139,140
The proposal included two payment adjustments: the Home Dialysis Payment
Adjustment (HDPA) and the Performance Payment Adjustment (PPA). The HDPA is a positive
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payment adjustment for participating facilities; the PPA is a combination of positive payments
adjustments and negative penalizations of facility reimbursements under Medicare. The ultimate
goal of the proposal is to have 80% of kidney patients on either home dialysis or to have a
kidney transplant. More specifically, in the words of CMS, “the proposed ETC Model would be
a mandatory payment model focused on encouraging greater use of home dialysis and kidney
transplants, in order to preserve or enhance the quality of care furnished to Medicare
beneficiaries while reducing Medicare expenditures.”141 Importantly, as the model stands right
now, participating ESRD facilities and managing clinicians would not have the option to opt out.
The model utilizes the pre-existing structures of the ESRD Prospective Payment System
(PPS) and the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS). The PPS is a required payment system
under Medicare that bundles services at a patient and facility level to pay ESRD facilities for
renal dialysis services. The PFS operates as the vehicle for adjusting physician Medicare
reimbursements in this model, with reimbursements being less or more according to whether the
physicians accomplish the model’s goals. In other words, the model does not necessarily create
any new structures within the CMS, but rather extends previous avenues for payment
adjustments in order in order to enact both monetary incentives and monetary penalties.
All payment adjustments would be within the Medicare Shared Savings Programs
(MSSP), a payment model that allows providers to become an Accountable Care Organization
(ACO), defined as an organization that “agrees to be held accountable for the quality, cost, and
experience of care of an assigned Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiary population.”142
Medicare payments to these participating ESRD facilities and Managing Clinicians (clinicians

141

Ibid, 1.
“About the Program | CMS,” accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-forService-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/about.
142

68

who bill the Monthly Capitation Payment (MCP) for managing ESRD Beneficiaries) are either
increased or decreased in this payment model according to their enactment of its objectives. All
savings and expenditures for the program would be listed under the Medicare Shared Savings
Program budget. Ultimately, the goal of the program is to reduce Medicare expenditures
associated with kidney disease.
4.3.2 Identified Problems the ETC Model Aims to Address
In the introductory sections of the ETC, the CMS recognizes the current challenges for
kidney patients in the U.S., as well as the research that undergirds the goals of the proposal.
Authors of the initiative note that home dialysis and transplantation, the primary treatment
models supported in the proposal, are recognized “among health care providers and patients as
preferable alternatives to in-center hemodialysis (HD), but the utilization rate of these services in
the United States (U.S.) has been below such rates in other developed nations.”143 The authors
also recognize, in reference to the goal of reducing expenditures, the current situation in which
“ESRD beneficiaries have accounted for about 1 percent of the Medicare population and
accounted for approximately 7 percent of total Medicare spending,'' 144 and that this
disproportionate spending must be remedied.
The proposal describes ESRD patients as one of the “most medically fragile and highcost populations served by the Medicare program.”145 Drawing on 2018 data from the United
States Renal Data System (USRDS), the proposal also acknowledges ESRD patients as Medicare
beneficiaries with a mortality “greatly exceeding that of the general Medicare population.”146 In
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sum, the proposal recognizes ESRD beneficiaries as a section of the Medicare population “with
poor clinical outcomes and potentially avoidable expenditures,” 147 and thus prime targets for
care adjustments and budget reassessment. This sentiment echoes that of most American and
global kidney care researchers.
These care adjustments include increased utilization of home dialysis and transplantation.
Citing several studies, the authors claim that home dialysis has the potential to improve patient
outcomes and reduce costs (due to “lower rates of infection associated with dialysis treatment,
fewer hospitalizations, cost differentials between PD and HD services and supplies, and lower
operating costs for dialysis providers for providing home dialysis”) 148,149,150,151 These studies
also jointly emphasize the need for bolstered education to offset misconceptions about home
dialysis, the importance of strong support systems for patients transitioning to home dialysis, and
the potential of peritoneal dialysis to be a safer modality with lower mortality rates and
comorbidities.152 It is important to note, however, that while this is quoted in the proposal, such
details are not actually included in the model.
The proposal recognizes that barriers to home dialysis utilization exist in the United
States, including “ease of initiation, physician experience and training, misinformation around
other modalities, inadequate education for CKD beneficiaries, built-up capacity at ESRD
facilities, and a lack of infrastructure to support home dialysis,” in addition to “the monthly visit
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requirement..., the need for home care partner support, as well as philosophies and business
practices of dialysis providers...lack of independence for home dialysis clinics, and businessoriented restrictions that lead to inefficient supply distribution.”153
The low rates of kidney transplantation in the U.S. is another primary target of the
proposal. As detailed in Chapter 3, the proposal echoes the sentiment of many in the field that
transplant rates have ample room for improvement. The proposal cites a 2011 study, “Systematic
review: kidney transplantation compared with dialysis in clinically relevant outcomes,” which
found lower mortality rates, lower rates of comorbidities, and higher quality of life for patients
who received a transplant rather than dialysis.154 The lower cost of transplantation is largely
undisputed, as there is for the most part no need for longer-term care costs other than check-ups
once a patient has had their kidney transplanted successfully.155,156
In short, the ultimate goals of this model rest on the intersection between the recognized
issues of underutilization of transplantation and home dialysis and their status as cheaper
treatment options, an intersection that has long been recognized by kidney experts around the
world.
4.3.3 Methodology
The ETC Model is the first-ever mandatory payment model for ESRD facilities and
managing clinicians.157 The model will be tested on approximately 50% of all ESRD
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beneficiaries. This large sample size is cited as necessary in order to approximate accurate and
statistically significant results regarding the effectiveness of the proposal, especially for
transplants, which currently occur in fairly low numbers. The initiative authors also note that a
large sample size allows for a more accurate capture of the wide range of circumstances
experienced by kidney patients and that its mandatory nature helps avoid self-selection bias.158
In order to select which facilities and clinicians will participate in the sample group and
which will be in the comparator group, CMS is using the Dartmouth Atlas Project HRR
geographic unit (hospital referral regions). There are 306 HRR’s in the U.S., and within each
geographic region the DAP will randomly select 50% of ESRD beneficiaries.159 This selection
method was chosen over Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs), or states as geographic units due to either inappropriate sizes for the analysis or due to
their exclusion of certain groups.
4.3.4 Components of the ETC Model
4.3.4.1 HDPA
The Home Dialysis Payment Adjustment (HDPA) is a positive payment adjustment that
would incentivize transitions to home dialysis and higher rates of transplantation in facilities.
Neither this nor the PPA would impact beneficiaries’ out of pocket costs. Within the HDPA there
are proposed Clinician HDPAs (which would be monthly capitated payments included in the
Managing Clinician's dialysis claims) and Facility HDPAs (which would be adjusted within the
facility’s ESRD PPS per treatment base rate). All model participants (50% of all facilities in the
United States) must be included in the HDPA. The HDPA is categorized as a process-based
initiative that will slowly be phased out as the outcomes-based PPA is phased in. The HDPA will
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only run for the first three years, 2020 to 2022, by which time the PPA will take its place. Figure
3.1 shows the scoring for the HDPA from CY 2020 to CY 2026, with it being phased out by CY
2023 following decreasing magnitudes of payment adjustments.160

Figure 4.1. Proposed HDPA Schedule, National Kidney Foundation, “Launch of
Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative”
(National Kidney Foundation (NKF), July 18, 2019),
https://www.kidney.org/sites/default/files/20190718_clinicians_advancing-kidney-health-etcmodel-summary_final.pdf.
4.3.4.2 PPA
The Performance Payment Adjustment (PPA) model includes both positive and negative
payment adjustments, the magnitude of which are both set to slowly increase over time. The
PPA is staggered to begin on July 1, 2021, and would run through 2026, with the brunt of the
negative payment adjustments being carried by facilities rather than individual clinicians.
In order to determine the PPA payment adjustments for facilities, the Modality
Performance Score (MPS) will be used to assess changes in rates of home dialysis and
transplantation. Home dialysis scores count for two thirds of the MPS, while the transplant score
only counts for one third.161 To calculate home dialysis rates, home dialysis treatment
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beneficiary years will be divided by total dialysis treatment beneficiary years that Measurement
Year (MY). Transplant rates will be determined by dividing the total number of transplanted
beneficiaries by total dialysis treatment beneficiary years. In other words, these measure the rate
of change to home dialysis and transplantation over time. This data will come from “Medicare
claims data, Medicare administrative data, and data from the SRTR in order to reduce the
reporting burden on Model participants.”162
Two benchmarks are used to determine the MPS. The first benchmark is the
“achievement score,” which is the past year of historical rates in the comparator geographic
areas. The second benchmark is the “improvement score,” or the Model participant’s increase in
home dialysis and transplant rates compared to that participant’s scores in the past. The
achievement score tracks how well individual facilities are improving compared to facilities with
similar populations and circumstances, while the improvement score measures progress toward
the ETC goals. The Model participants cannot achieve the highest performance score through the
improvement benchmark alone, meaning they must show achievements compared to their
geographic comparator region as well. The highest benchmark possible would be the
achievement of 80% of patients being on home dialysis or transplantation.
The MPS will be calculated annually as a Measurement Year (MY), with payments
adjusting every six months.163 Figure 4.2 shows the scoring for both benchmarks for MY 1 and
MY 2. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the facility and clinician PPA amounts and schedules. Put
another way, these figures are essentially rubrics for how well participants improved their
achievement and improvement scores.
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Figure 4.2. Benchmark year Scoring, National Kidney Foundation, “Launch of
Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative”.

Table 4.3. Proposed Facility Performance Payment Adjustments Amounts and Schedule,
National Kidney Foundation.

Figure 4.4. Proposed Clinician Performance Payment Adjustment and Schedule, National
Kidney Foundation.
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4.3.5 Recognized Limitations
The ETC Model authors recognize several limitations that may affect the outcomes and
results of the model. One of the primary limitations is the potential for physicians cherry picking
(selectively picking healthier patients), and lemon dropping (selectively avoiding high-risk
patients) in order to meet benchmarks and receive their payments. The proposal aims to avoid
such practices and explicitly prohibits model participants from either a) “taking action to avoid
treating beneficiaries with chronic conditions such as obesity or diabetes, or who are entitled to
Medicaid because of disability;” and b) “taking any action to selectively target or engage
beneficiaries who are relatively healthy or otherwise expected to improve the model participant’s
or downstream participant’s financial or quality performance.”164 Beyond these sentiments,
however, the model includes no other tangible guidelines or measures to protect patients from
these possible biases.
In the summary submitted to the Federal Registrar, CMS notes the overlap of the ETC
with other CMS programs and initiatives. While the authors acknowledge that any overlap with
other programs would have shared interests and priorities, and thus would be compatible in
intention, they also admit this could result in “repetitive services or duplicative payments and
commit to avoiding them.”165
4.3.6 Projected Effects
The CMS modelled the possible financial impacts of the ETC proposal through a
stochastic simulation run 500 times. The simulation used data from 2016 and 2017 Managing
Clinician’s Medicare claims for dialysis and transplants. With the HDPA constituting an upward
payment adjustment, and the PPA constituting both an upward and downward payment
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adjustment, the model was run and found an estimated net savings to Medicare of $185 million
dollars between January 1, 2020 and June 30, 2026. The model also projected a $15 million
increase in expenditures implementation. This resulted in a net impact of $169 million dollars in
savings (total Medicare ESRD Spending was $35 billion in 2016).166 Figure 4.5 shows the
modelled financial impacts on expenditures for the entirety of the ETC model via the simulations
conducted by the CMS.

Figure 4.5. Proposed Estimates of Medicare Program Savings (Rounded $ Million) for Proposed
ESRD Treatment Choices Model, Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, “Regulations.Gov Proposed Rule Document: Medicare Program: Speciality Care Models to Improve Quality of
Care and Reduce Expenditures,” regulations.gov, September 16, 2019,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CMS-2019-0101-0001, 321.
In terms of the projected success of the ETC at attaining its benchmarks, the model found
that home dialysis would ultimately represent “approximately 19 percent of overall maintenance
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dialysis in selected geographic areas by 2026.” The model did not reach an official assumption
for how attainable the transplantation benchmarks were. Clearly, while projections past 2026 are
not available, this is nowhere near the goal of 80% on both modalities.

4.4 Removing Financial Disincentives to Living Organ Donation
Another important portion of the AAKH deals with the living organ donor system. The
“Removing Disincentives to Living Organ Donation” model was released on December 20,
2019, with the notice and comment period ending on February 18.167 This aspect of the AAKH
holds potential for addressing issues with the U.S. kidney transplantation system, but as the final
proposal has not been released yet, only the preliminary proposal models can be analyzed in this
project.
The proposal plans to amend the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984 so as to
address aspects of the current system that make living organ donation very difficult for the
donors. Recall that within the current system, although the procedure itself is covered for the
donor under the recipient’s health insurance plan, extraneous costs such as child care and lost
wages are not covered or reimbursed. These financial and time-based barriers are primary
disincentives for those who would otherwise be willing candidates to be living donors in the
United States. The ETC proposal builds off protocols executed by The National Living Donor
Assistance Center (NLDAC), an HRSA-funded grant program that has handled the living donor
network since 2006. Through the NLDAC grant, some living donors have been able to apply for
reimbursements, although it has been limited to a small portion of low-income living donors.
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Under the new proposal, lost wages (including loss of income from missing work during
the transplant process, evaluation, surgery, recovery period, and follow-up visits) would be
reimbursed for many more living donors than the current NLDAC grant currently covers, as well
as any expenses incurred to the donor for child care or elder care. While the average
reimbursement for grant recipients is currently $1,934, the new proposal would cover wages at
$28/hour for 40 hours per week (averaging $1,120 per week), child care at $420 per week, and
elder care at $504 per week. The current NLDAC system prioritizes lower-income donors, but
with the new proposal, the upper threshold of the income would be raised to include more
donors.168 The reimbursement will be tailored to the circumstances and repercussions
experienced by each donor following the surgery, meaning some donors will not be reimbursed,
including those above the income threshold.
This aspect of the proposal is based on the successes of previous adjustments to the U.S.
system (such as the NLDAC grants) as well as similar programs in other countries (such as the
programs implemented by Israel discussed in Chapter 3).169 One U.S. survey found that 75% of
current donors would not have donated without reimbursements.170 With a predicted 20%
increase in rates of living donors for a year, this proposal could make possible 500 new kidney
transplants annually. This, in turn, is predicted by CMS to translate into $68 million in Medicare
savings over 10 years if the program is successful. The proposal retains the clause in the NOTA
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that bans the transfer to living donors of valuable considerations that go beyond reimbursements
for the reasonable payments involved with the procedure.

4.5 Reactions of the Kidney Community: Notice and Comment Period
Notice and Comment for the Proposed ETC Model opened on September 18, 2019. Three
hundred and twenty-nine comments were submitted in total. These comments came from a range
of stakeholders in the kidney community, including those in the clinical realm, such as
nephrologist organizations and researchers, and advocacy and patient groups.
4.5.1 Clinical Comments
On the clinical side, organizations such as the Mayo Clinic, the Society of Nephrology,
National Kidney Foundation, and various dialysis and kidney care networks submitted their
concerns about the model. The comments primarily addressed the negative repercussions the
proposal could have on clinics and the feasibility of such a quick transition into the model. The
comments also highlighted the possible negative effects the proposal could have on their
patients. As stakeholders familiar with the lives and choices of kidney patients, these
commenters also brought up concerns that the model does not recognize the diversity of
experiences among kidney patients and that the proposal was trying to provide home dialysis and
transplantation to more patients than could actually benefit from these treatments. Nearly all of
these commenters argued that the 80% goal for transplantation and home dialysis was an
overcorrection. 171,172,173
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Clinical groups also argued that the negative impacts on facilities would be too great,
with small dialysis facilities or networks being put at even greater risk.174 Several groups noted
that the risks outweigh the positive payment bonuses, especially in the early years of the model.
Rogosin (a NYC-based network of dialysis clinics) argued that the transitions to home dialysis
for smaller-scale centers like themselves would be made more difficult by their disconnect from
the home dialysis supply chain as compared to the large companies that also control
manufacturing. One of the monopolies in dialysis, DaVita, actually argued similar points, noting
concern for small scale providers. DaVita went on to raise concern that patients could be
negatively affected by lemon dropping, and facilities that tend to serve-low income and high-risk
groups may also be penalized if they choose not to prescribe the treatments incentivized by the
payment model. DaVita, alongside many other clinical entities, argued that these facilities must
be better protected or removed from the model.175
In regards to the validity of the payment model methodology, Rogosin argued that the
models do not account for vast variations in baseline rates of home dialysis utilization. Such
variations can arise from a multitude of factors; they described:
“wide variations in rates of home dialysis and transplantation based on patient age (4X and
100X difference), race (2X and 15X difference), and primary cause of ESRD (3X and 23X
difference) for incident patients (Figure 3.) and age (2X and 6X difference), race (1.5X and
2X difference) and primary cause of ESRD (2X and 4X difference) for prevalent patients
(see Figure 4)”176
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Thus, within the payment model calculation the patient population denominator needs to
be better risk adjusted, especially for geographic regions that have high rates of high-risk
patients.
4.5.2 Patients and Advocates
From the perspective of patients and patient advocates, the main flaws in the proposal
again lie in the over adjustment to transplantation and home dialysis, echoing the sentiments of
the comments from the clinical realm. In addition, patients and patient advocates warned in their
comments, the protections against cherry picking and lemon dropping are not nearly strong
enough to buffer patients against adverse selection.177 Patient commenters also called for more
transparency on models such as this in order to empower patients to engage their care planning.
The Coalition for Supportive Care of Kidney Patients suggested that rather than emphasizing
length of life, multiple studies have shown patients prioritize quality of life.178 These
stakeholders also argued that the care coordination and priorities of the kidney care community
should reflect this reality, and that palliative care should be included as a positively rewarded
treatment option.
Many groups argued that certain adjustments and clarifications are necessary in order for
the model to achieve its’ goals without harming patients' choices and outcomes. The pressure
towards home dialysis, combined with a lack of education and transparency for the patients,
worries these groups. Like the clinical groups, they urge vigorous oversight on the part of CMS

177

Lori Hartwell, “Executive Orger RSN Comments,” September 16, 2019,
file:///Users/pherb/Downloads/ExecutiveOrderRSNCommentsSept16_2019%20(1).pdf.
178
Coalition for Supportive Care of Kidney Patients (CSCKP), “Coalition for Supportive Care of Kidney Patients
Comment on Proposed Required ETC Model,” September 16, 2019,
file:///Users/pherb/Downloads/ETC_model_reg_comments_CSCKP_-19-9-16_letterhead%20(5).pdf.

82

to avoid cherry picking and lemon dropping, and they request specific measures rather than
vague commitments to those issues.

4.6 Discussion
The ETC Model and Removing Disincentives proposal both address primary issues with
the kidney disease care system in the United States. However, with 63% of kidney patients
receiving in center dialysis, and 29% of prevalent patients having transplants currently, the shift
to 80% on home dialysis and transplantation would constitute a massive transition in care
practices.179 With such a dramatic transition, adverse patient outcomes are almost guaranteed,
especially considering the lack of educational opportunities presented in the model and the harsh
penalties model participants will receive if they fail to meet benchmarks. Considering the advice
of global researchers, and the current state of the U.S. kidney care system, a less drastic and
more cautious model is advised, as is discussed in the conclusion chapter.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This research aimed to identify both the primary issues within the United States kidney
disease care system and the extent to which these problems were adequately addressed in two
key portions of the Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative. Those two portions are: the
Proposed End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices Model (or ETC Model) and the
Removing Financial Disincentives to Living Organ Donation Model. Insights and examples from
global researchers, clinicians, and policy makers (especially fellow industrialized countries) were
essential in this analysis in order to identify alternative models that the United States could
utilize. Limitations to this research included the dearth of international comparisons, as well as
the fact that as of April 29, 2020 the proposal’s final version has yet to be released. As a result,
the author could analyze only the proposed version.
This research found that in certain ways, the ETC Model succeeded in addressing the
major requests of the kidney community and did so by taking into account examples from global
models and research. However, issues remain in the realm of patient protection and the viability
of the model’s goals. In particular, it bears repeating that enthusiasm about the Trump
administration’s attempts to alter an entitlement program that serves such a vulnerable patient
population must be tempered with a certain degree of caution and a willingness to continue to
push for meaningful reform. The proposal as it stands remains in a grey area, walking a thin line
between enthusiastically and productively addressing the very real issues of the U.S. kidney care
system, and making these changes too swiftly and drastically for them to be safe and effective.
From the time of diagnosis to treatment, a kidney patient’s care in the United States is
more expensive and less successful than the care kidney patients receive in other industrialized
countries. Missed opportunities for early intervention and prevention of kidney disease, and the
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prevalence of its upstream risk factors (such as diabetes and hypertension), contribute to the high
rates of late stage ESRD. This burden is especially heavy for low-income, African American,
Hispanic, and Indigenous populations, who are disproportionately affected by all three diseases.
When it comes to treatment, the two most successful and cost-efficient treatment
modalities — transplantation and in-home peritoneal dialysis — are underutilized in the United
States. Barriers to higher rates of transplantation include the opt-in structure of the U.S. organ
donation system, high discard rates of kidneys, and the shortage of living donors. In addition,
many researchers believe that palliative and end-of life care are not prescribed often enough for
elderly patients. Strikingly, mortality rates for kidney patients in the U.S. are much higher than in
other industrial countries, which some researchers blame on inconsistent practice patterns and
treatment regimens.180
The Medicare entitlement program that governs kidney care has not had a major revision
since its creation in the 1970’s, and it is obvious that major change is necessary to address the
above issues. Taken together, the ETC Model and Removing Financial Disincentives to Living
Organ Donation Model, which are the two most substantive pieces of legislation released under
the Advancing American Kidney Health Initiative, constitute the first major change to kidney
care in decades. The extent to which these two models effectively recognize and address the
existing issues in U.S. kidney care is largely dependent on the details currently missing from the
proposals, such as transparency to patients, risk adjustments for high-risk patients, education and
collaboration with the providers executing the changes, and the feasibility of the benchmarks
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themselves. Of particular relevance here is the means by which these goals are to be achieved, as
will be analyzed below.
One area where the ETC Model succeeds in using models from global research and
policy to address an issue is in its promotion of in-home peritoneal dialysis. The potential of
peritoneal dialysis for achieving cost savings and improving patient outcomes is readily apparent
in recent literature. Yet, the logistics of a major shift from current treatments to peritoneal
dialysis are essential to the success of such campaigns. In their article “Peritoneal Dialysis First
Policy Made Successful,” Philip Kam-tao Li and Kai Ming Chow found that the three most
important factors for a successful PD First campaign were “nephrologist experience and
expertise, peritoneal dialysis catheter access, and psychosocial support for PD patients.” While
the Trump proposal succeeds in recognizing the need and merit for shifting to peritoneal dialysis,
the crucial educational elements are absent. Instead, the initiative counts on mandatory positive
and negative payment models to force physicians’ behavior while neglecting to set up the
necessary support systems for such massive transitions.
Because it is a cheaper alternative to in-center dialysis, and one that improves patient
autonomy, a push to increase utilization of PD is prudent. However, caution must be taken to
avoid over implementing the suggestions, especially if one takes into consideration for what
proportion of patients this treatment could, realistically, actually work. The choice of treatment
must be made primarily according to what works best for the patient’s lifestyle, priorities, and
comfort. The ETC’s 80% benchmark for a shift to home dialysis and transplantation sounds
promising. Yet it risks pushing physicians to pressure patients to try these treatments when it
may, in fact, not be appropriate. Patients who live in unstable housing situations, for instance, or
who have no viable “care partners” would have trouble complying with the rigors of a PD
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regimen. (This is not just idle speculation. Even the simulations run by the CMS to project the
financial impact of the proposal found that it would be unlikely to achieve the 80% benchmark. )
The topic of patient protections is a particularly important aspect that is missing from the
ETC Model. The model, for instance, does not include any section that discusses making
information about the initiative transparent to patients. As the model would encompass 50% of
all facilities in the U.S., it would be prudent to ensure that patients are: a) informed of their
facility’s participation in the model; and b) continue to be given agency in the selection of their
treatment modality according to their personal resource and situations.
Paralleling this issue is the potential pitfall of adverse patient selection under this model.
Facilities may lemon drop or cherry pick patients (i.e., drop high-risk patients and/or select lowrisk patients so as to more readily reach the benchmarks and benefit from the positive
incentives). Second, this same lack of protections against adverse patient selection may also
disadvantage providers practicing in communities composed primarily of high-risk patients. That
is because it will become particularly difficult for those providers to reach the benchmarks (due
to underlying social and health issues their patients experience), which would make them
vulnerable to the disproportionate negative payment penalties. As such, facilities such as these
should either not be included in the model or have different benchmarks that take into
consideration their patients’ more difficult circumstances.
The home dialysis requirements of the proposal also puts small dialysis centers at risk.
While large companies such as DaVita and Fresenius manufacture their own dialysis equipment,
small facilities or networks would have a more difficult time getting up to speed on the necessary
home dialysis training and equipment preparation. (Had the model launched in January 2020 as
originally proposed, small facilities would most certainly not have had adequate time to prepare
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for such drastic shifts.) These negative impacts on smaller dialysis centers and those in
communities with high-risk patients only serves to enhance the unfair power dynamic created by
monopolies in dialysis centers, with 80% of the market already controlled by these two
companies.
In the realm of transplantation, the Removing Financial Disincentives to Living Organ
Donation Model works to increase the pool of living donors and reimburse them for accrued
costs surrounding the procedure. While the current system allows for a small number of grants to
be distributed to low-income living donors, this new model widens the scope of people eligible
for receiving reimbursement for lost wages, child care, and elder care. The system works to
remove the disincentives to living organ donors, primarily those cited above, in order to make it
more viable for more people to join the living organ donor pool.
The merits and ethics of such patient payment strategies have been contested, in part due
to concerns about the possibility of low-income people being coerced into organ donation.
However, exploitation of low-income groups is of more concern for incentive models (currently
banned under the valuable consideration clause of the NOTA) rather than reimbursement
models. As described in Chapter 4, the AAKH’s reimbursement system does not trespass into
“valuable consideration” territory, as it is a payment associated with the cost of the procedure
rather than an unrelated large sum of money. As such, the proposed model directly addresses the
financial disincentives disproportionately faced by low-income patients and donors without
being coercive. In addition, the potential for exploitative effects of reimbursement strategies on
low-income donors is mitigated by the strict health standards used for assessing living donor
candidates. If anything, the best strategy for expanding the pool of living organ donors would be
to put more emphasis and funding into prevention programs targeting such contributing diseases
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as diabetes and hypertension (which are disqualifying factors for living donation and thus
constitute a large barrier to living donation eligibility for low-income populations). This strategy,
of course, would simultaneously lower kidney disease rates and the consequent need for
transplantation in the first place.
Unfortunately, the model was unable to incorporate what would potentially be the most
effective change: transitioning to an opt-out system. Such a task is vastly larger than the scope of
the AAKH and one that has failed when attempted at state-wide levels, as described in Chapter 2,
largely due to political and religious concerns. Still, the potential remains to increase
transplantation rates in the future if policy makers can succeed in educating the public on the
merits of deceased organ donation.
The high discard rates of kidneys also continues to be an issue in the United States, with
other countries, such as Norway, illustrating the viability of a transplantation program based on
lower standards for organ allocation. While the AAKH cited lower standards as a primary
objective of the original proposal, specific legislation has yet to be released. This issue of the
CMS failing to meet its self-imposed deadlines extends to many aspects of the AAKH. Most
notably, the final version of the ETC Model following the notice and comment period was
supposed to be released in January of 2020. As of April 29, 2020, the day this project was
submitted, the CMS had yet to release the final version of the model, and it seemed likely its
release would be further delayed by the ongoing burden of the COVID-19 crisis on the health
care sector.
One especially important element that is missing from these proposals is that of
prevention. While the larger AAKH does include goals and objectives relating to upstream
prevention and detection efforts, actual action plans have yet to be released. In absence of
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educational programs and screening initiatives that address not only kidney disease but its
upstream contributors (such as diabetes and hypertension), the issues experienced by the growing
U.S. kidney disease population will only continue to be perpetuated. The author hopes the
prevention elements promised in the AAKH’s initial release will soon be detailed and
implemented.
It is surprising that a proposal whose very foundation is hinged on the Affordable Care
Act’s Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation could come from an administration that has
consistently exerted efforts to dismantle that same structure. It is equally surprising that Trump’s
administration, which has consistently ignored scientific evidence related to numerous
environmental, medical, and social issues, released a proposal that cohered to the
recommendations of global researchers, clinicians, and policy makers. Credit is due to those in
the CMS who succeeded in addressing the primary actions requested by those in the kidney
community for years. This does not change the fact that these innovations are paired with
reductions in expenditures and drastic care changes to an entitlement program that serves over
500,000 U.S. citizens, however. Nor does it change the fact that these reductions in expenditure
are achieved via mandatory monetary incentives and penalizations to physicians to spur drastic
changes in patients' treatments, without providing for educational programs to ease such a
transition. Based on these factors, policy makers should consider revisions to the proposed model
that would incorporate patient protection strategies, lower benchmarks, and a foundational
emphasis on prevention and detection so as to alleviate the burden of ESRD in the United States
in the first place. Further research and legislation is needed to make large-scale revisions to the
U.S. transplant system in order to effectively cut down wait list times and ensure access to the
best treatment for kidney disease patients, the transplant.
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